


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ON THE USE OF $\mu\eta$ WITH THE PARTICIPLE IN CLASSICAL GREEK.

A THESIS


PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES OF
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

BY

WILLIAM FRANCIS GALLAWAY.



BALTIMORE:
JOHN MURPHY & CO.
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ON THE USE OF *Mή* WITH THE PARTICIPLE IN CLASSICAL GREEK.

INTRODUCTION.

1. *Subject.*

In classical Greek the spheres of *οὐ* and *μή* were more or less clearly differentiated. But in later time, when the appreciation for the delicate shades of meaning conveyed by these negatives had been lost, the classical distinctions were, to a greater or less extent, effaced. For example, in Greek of the best period *μή* is the regular negative employed in the protasis of the conditional sentence, the few passages in which *οὐ* occurs being readily explained in accordance with the laws of the language. For either a single word is negatived, or the condition is really equivalent to a causal sentence (*εἰ — γε = ἐπει*), or the negative of the original thought is retained. In Hellenistic Greek, however, e. g., that of the New Testament, *οὐ* regularly follows *εἰ* when a fact is expressed and even in generic and future conditions.¹

Cf. John, v, 47: *εἰ δὲ τοῖς ἐκείνους γράμμασιν οὐ πιστεύετε*—ib., x, 37: *εἰ οὐ ποιῶ κτέ*—Heb., xii, 25: *εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἔξεφυγον*—I Cor., ix, 2; xi, 6; xv, 32; James, iii, 2: *εἴ τις ἐν λόγῳ οὐ πταίει*—Luke, xi, 8: *εἴ καὶ οὐ δώσει*—Rom., viii, 9.

Modern Greek goes one step further than this and uses the negative *δέν* (probably short for *οὐδέν*) in all kinds of conditional sentences.²

The encroachment of *οὐ* on *μή*, however, is slight in comparison with that of *μή* on *οὐ*. The lines of this intrusion have

¹Cf. Jebb, Appendix to Vincent and Dickson's Primer of Modern Greek.

²Cf. Mullach, Grammatik der griechischen Vulgarsprache, pp. 389–90.

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been clearly pointed out by Prof. Gildersleeve, American Journal of Philology, I, pp. 45–57.

They are as follows: (1) $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the infinitive in oratio obliqua—an extension of the classical usage after verbs of asseveration and belief; (2) $\delta\tau i \mu\bar{\eta}$ with the finite verb as a form of oratio obliqua—perhaps due to the desire to avoid hiatus, which frequently led later writers to sacrifice grammar to artistic effect; (3) causal $\mu\bar{\eta}$; (4) $\mu\bar{\eta}$ in relative sentences, and lastly participial $\mu\bar{\eta}$, where in all probability the most extensive invasion took place. Here again, as in the case of $o\bar{v}$ in the conditional sentence, modern Greek makes an advance on the writers of the post-classical period and does not combine any negative but $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle.¹

In view, therefore, of this gradual extension and finally universal application of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle, it becomes highly important to make a thorough examination of the classical usage in order to ascertain how far later writers were justified in their use of $\mu\bar{\eta}$.

2. *Scope.*

To this end the entire body of classical Greek, from Homer to Demosthenes, has been examined and all the instances of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle noted. From the material thus collected we hope to be able to show how far and in what connection the writers of the best period made use of this construction.

It may be well to cite here a list of the authors examined and editions referred to.

Homer. Ameis-Hentze.

Hesiod. Flach, Teubner, 1878.

Lyric Poets. Bergk, Teubner, 1878.

Aeschylus. Weil, Teubner, 1889.

Sophocles. Dindorf-Mekler, Teubner, 1889.

Euripides. Nauck, Teubner, 1891.

Fragmenta Tragicorum Graecorum. Nauck, Teubner, 1889.

Aristophanes. Bergk, Teubner, 1884.

Fragmenta Comicorum. Kock, Teubner, 1880–88.

¹ Mullach, l. c.; Gildersleeve, l. c., p. 55.

Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. Teubner editions.

Plato. Teubner.

Orators. Teubner.

All bracketed portions of the text and all laws and documents have been omitted, unless cited for purposes of comparison. In the case of Hypereides, only the speech ‘Τπὲρ Εὐξενίππου has been examined, as the fragmentary state of the others would invalidate any argument that might be drawn from them. The sixth volume of Plato, containing the spurious dialogues, *όροι*, letters, etc., has also been left out of our investigation. The doubtful dialogues of Plato and the doubtful orations of the orators have been included, as our object is not so much to show the individual usage of any special author as the origin and development of the construction in the Greek of the best period.

Before entering upon our subject proper, it is necessary to discuss briefly three points: (1) the use of *οὐ* and *μή* in classical Greek; (2) the function of the participle, and (3) the combination of the negatives with the participle.

3. *General View of οὐ and μή.*

Both *οὐ* and *μή* are doubtless Indo-European. We are sure of this in the case of *μή*, which is identical with the Sanskrit, Zend, and Old Persian prohibitive particle *mā*,¹ and we may perhaps connect *οὐ* with Zend *ava*, Latin *haud*.

The etymology, however, gives us very little except the original tone of *μή*. But we can afford to dispense with its aid in seeking to determine the classical distinctions between the two negative particles, for already in Homer their uses are so clearly defined that there is no possibility of confusion.² What then are the distinctions now generally accepted? In brief as follows: *οὐ* is the negative of fact, *μή*, in accordance with its derivation, of the will; *οὐ* is objective and belongs to the thing spoken of, *μή* is subjective and refers to the thought and will of the speaker.³ These broad outlines were fully recognized and clearly marked

¹ Cf. Prellwitz, *Etymologische Wörterbuch*, sub voc.

² Cf. Gildersleeve, l. c., p. 48.

³ Cf. Bäumlein, *Die griechischen Partikeln*, p. 257.

by the ancients.¹ Negation with *οὐ* was called *ἀρνησις* = denial. So Hesychius says *οὐ = ἐπίρρημα ἀρνητικὸν κατὰ στέρησιν*. On the other hand, negation with *μή* was called *ἀπαγόρευσις* = prohibition.

First, then, let us treat briefly the negative *οὐ*. This being the negative of the statement, we find it combined (1) with the indicative of the independent sentence and everything that represents the indicative; (2) with the optative with *ἂν* = potential of the present and future, and with the past tenses of the indicative with *ἄν* = the potential of the past. These sentences are, it is true, subjective, but they are assertions and not mere conceptions, and hence take *οὐ*, not *μή*.² (3) *οὐ* is used with the subjunctive in Homer when it is equivalent to the future; (4) in questions that expect an affirmative answer; (5) in subordinate sentences that represent the indicative, i. e., the indicative or optative after *ὅτι* or *ώς*, relative sentences that express a mere statement, temporal, causal, and consecutive sentences with the finite verb, the infinitive after verbs of saying and thinking, and the participle when it represents a sentence in which *οὐ* would have been used, unless the force of the principal verb is sufficient to cause *μή*. (6) *οὐ* is also used to negative a single word or to change it into its opposite, e. g., *οὐκ ἀγαθός = κακός*. Here it forms a quasi-compound, and the union is so close that, as a rule, *οὐ* remains even though the phrase represents or forms part of a sentence that demands *μή*. Cf. Iliad, III, 288 fol.: *εἰ . . . Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παιδες τίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν*; Lysias, XIII, 62: *εἰ μὲν οὐ πολλοὶ ἥσαν*.³

At times also the image of *oratio obliqua* comes in and preserves *οὐ* where we should expect *μή*. Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 458 E: *ῶστ’ ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα. φῆς* precedes.⁴

This, then, is all that need be said of the negative *οὐ*. For examples under any of the above heads see Bäumlein.

¹ Cf. Ety. Magnum, 585–49 to 586–30, also under *οὐχί*.

² Cf. Aken, Tempus und Modus, §§ 54, 72, 315; Bäumlein, p. 259.

³ Aken, Frohberger, and Rehdantz deny this, especially in the conditional sentence. *οὐ*, they say, represents the negative of the original thought. Cf. Aken, § 229; Frohberger to Lysias, 13, 62.

⁴ Cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., vii, 174.

We turn now to the consideration of *μή*. We have already seen that this was originally not a negative at all, but a prohibitive particle, an interjection accompanied by a gesture of repulsion or rejection.¹ As such it was connected in Sanskrit with the injunctive.² Greek, however, has no injunctive, the functions of which have been merged into the subjunctive. Hence we find in the earliest monuments of Greek literature prohibition expressed by the aorist subjunctive with *μή*. The present subjunctive appears only in the first person plural. For example, cf. Homer, Iliad, II, 435 :

*μηκέτι νῦν δήθ' αὖθι λεγώμεθα, μηδ' ἔτι δηρὸν
ἀμβαλλώμεθα ἔργον.*

The original prohibitive force of *μή* with the present subjunctive also appears in hesitating statements, e. g., Plato, Gorgias, 462 E : *μὴ ἀγροικότερον γέ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.*

From the subjunctive *μή* spread naturally to the imperative. For the imperative was used originally only in a positive sense, prohibition being always expressed by *μὴ* with the subjunctive. This step had already been taken by Sanskrit, which in the classical period combined *mā* with the imperative and optative as well as with the injunctive. *μή* with the imperative, then, is but an analogical imitation of *μή* with the subjunctive.

We next find *μή* combined with the optative in the independent sentence, a construction that is readily understood when we remember that the pure optative expresses all shades of meaning from a command to a simple wish. Cf. Homer, Iliad, xxiv, 178 : *κῆρύξ τις ἔποιτο*; Od., xxiv, 491 : *ἔξελθών τις ἴδοι*.³

The next extension of *μή* was to the infinitive, which when used as an imperative takes *μή* as a matter of course. Likewise after verbs of will and command, *βούλομαι*, *κελεύω*, etc., the infinitive has an imperative force and hence is negated by *μή*. The use of this negative was further extended to verbs that involve the will, i. e., verbs of swearing, believing, etc. Hence in

¹ Cf. Vogrinz, Hom. Gram., p. 234.

² Cf. Delbrück, Altind. Syn., § 267; Miller, A. J. P., 13, 423.

³ Cf. Aken, § 49; Whitney, Skt. Gram., § 573.

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the early period $\mu\bar{\eta}$ was the negative of the infinitive throughout. When oratio obliqua came in, the infinitive after verbs of saying and thinking being the representative of the indicative, naturally took $o\bar{v}$.

Strictly speaking, $\mu\bar{\eta}$ has no right to be combined with the indicative, the proper negative of which is, as we have already seen, $o\bar{v}$. Only with great difficulty, therefore, did it take this step, and it appears in only a few constructions—as, for instance, in the protasis of the unreal condition, past wishes, oaths, questions that anticipate a negative answer, $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ with the future indicative, with verbs of fear when the action is present or past, and in purpose clauses with the historical tenses. Finally $\mu\bar{\eta}$ came to be used with the participle, and it is with the development and use of this construction that our present investigation deals.

We may sum up the uses of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ in classical Greek, all of which go back to the will of the speaker, as follows :

I. In the independent sentence $\mu\bar{\eta}$ is used with :

- the subjunctive = prohibition ;
- the imperative ;
- the optative and past tenses of the indicative in wishes ;
- hesitating statements and dubitative questions ;
- questions that anticipate a negative answer ;
- oaths.

II. In the dependent sentence it is used :

- after verbs of fear—where the subordinate clause is only semi-dependent ;
- in final clauses with $\tilde{\nu}\alpha$, $\dot{\omega}\varsigma$, $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$;
- in the protasis of conditional clauses ;
- in relative sentences if they express final, conditional, or generic relations ;
- in temporal sentences when they are equal to conditional or generic sentences ;
- with the infinitive after verbs and expressions that involve the will and after $\tilde{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$;
- and finally with the participle when it represents or forms part of a sentence that demands $\mu\bar{\eta}$.

The combinations of the negatives *οὐ μή* and *μή οὐ* should also be considered. But it is not our intention to enter into a full discussion of the negatives. We only propose to give a general view, a brief outline, in order that the development of *μή* with the participle may be seen in its historical connection. Hence we may pass over *οὐ μή* as having no direct bearing on our subject and postpone the discussion of *μή οὐ* until we come to that chapter in our treatment of *μή* with the participle.¹

4. *General View of the Participle.*

Another preliminary subject that calls for attention is a general view of the participle and its employment as a representative of the finite clause.

The Greeks were very fond of the participle, and hence they not only developed a large number of forms, but also used them freely.² This free use is shown in two directions: (1) by the actual number of participles used, and (2) by the great freedom with which the participle is employed as a substitute for the finite verb. As to the first, and the stylistic effect produced thereby, since it has no direct connection with our subject, we may pass it over without comment.³ It is with the second that we are more directly concerned.

We might suppose that the Homeric poems, the first monuments of Greek literature, would show us the participle in an undeveloped state. And so they do to some extent, but not nearly so much as we should suppose. Indeed, Classen, as cited above, p. 44, even claims, on the basis of a complete study of the participle in Homer, that the Homeric use is as fully developed as that of later times.

“Wir finden,” he says, “den ganzen reichtum an formen, welchen die griechische sprache im participium entwickelt hat, in der homerischen poesie entfaltet, und wir sehen ihn mit einer

¹ For the treatment of *οὐ μή*, cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., III, 202 fol.; Morris, Proceedings Amer. Phil. Asso., 1882, vol. 13, p. 35.

² Cf. Classen, Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch, p. 41.

³ For treatment, cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., IX, 137 ff.; J. H. U. Circular, 1888, p. 23.

freiheit und feinheit jedem bedürfniss des gedankens angepasst, die in keiner beziehung dem gebildetsten ausdruck der attischen prosa nachsteht." We must, I think, accept this with some modification, for while it may be true that all the germs of later constructions are found in Homer, it is nevertheless also true that the participle in these early poems has not the same sweep as in later works, but is still largely adjectival in its character; and by nothing is this adjectival nature better shown than by the reluctance, we might almost say absolute refusal, of Homer to join *μή* with the participle.

Assuming, therefore, that the development of the participle is largely pre-Homeric, we shall simply give a brief resumé of its use in classical Greek, without attempting to trace its growth.

The three broad divisions into which the uses of the participle fall are the nominal, the verbal, and the supplementary. Under the first head come those participles which are used to modify a noun like an ordinary attributive adjective, e. g., *τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος*, Dem., 18, 12, or with the article as a substantive, e. g., *τὰ πεπραγμένα*, Dem., 18, 4, or as a predicate with *εἰμί*, e. g., *βαδίζων εἰμί*, Aristoph., Ranæ, 36.

Under the second head come those cases where the participle modifies the verb, not the noun, taking the place of a subordinate clause. So widespread is this use that almost without exception may a subordinate clause be thus represented. So the various relations of time, cause, finality, concession, limitation, condition, manner, result, may all be expressed by the participle. But under temporal clauses we must exclude *ἔως ᾧ* with the subjunctive, which cannot be so represented,¹ and under final clauses verbs of fear, after which the participle is not used.² After *ώστε*, also, the participle is rare, and found chiefly after verbs of perception in the leading clause.³

Under the head of the supplementary participle are included those cases in which the participle is used to complete the mean-

¹ According to Prof. Gildersleeve.

² Cf. Kühner, Ausführliche Gram., § 490, 1, and Lodge, Participle in Euripides, who do not make even these exceptions, but say that every subordinate clause may be represented by the participle.

³ Cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., vii, 172.

ing of a verb, e. g., *αισχύνομαι λέγων*. It very often takes the place of an accusative and the infinitive, e. g., *ολδά σε λέγοντα*, Xen., Cyr., I, 6, 6.

5. Combination of the Negatives with the Participle.

After this brief and rapid survey of the negatives and the participle, we are now prepared to see how the two were combined.

Whatever was the original feeling of the participle, it came to be regarded, in the classical period at least, as an abridged sentence. This is most manifest, perhaps, from the fact that we occasionally find *εἰ μὲν* with the finite verb contrasted with a conditional participle with *δέ*, or vice versa, e. g., Xen., Cyr., VIII, 1, 12: *μὴ ὅντων μὲν οἴων δεῖ . . . εἰ δ' οὐτοι εἰς οἴοντος δέοι κτέ.*

As the representative, therefore, of a finite verb, we may state it as a general rule that *the participle takes the negative of the clause into which it may be resolved.* Thus the participle used as an adjective or as the representative of a causal or adversative sentence would naturally take *οὐ*, since it is then a mere statement of fact and has no connection with the will; but, on the other hand, the participle used as a substitute for a conditional or a concessive clause takes *μή*, since here the will of the speaker enters. But another element must also be taken into consideration, i. e., the influence of the principal verb of the sentence. We have already seen (p. 8) that the image of *oratio obliqua* is sometimes sufficient to produce *οὐ* where *μή* would be more natural. The opposite is also true. For not infrequently the force of the principal verb, especially an imperative, is sufficient to cause *μή* to be used with the participle, although the latter would more naturally take *οὐ*.¹ This is contrary to the view held by Aken, *Tempus und Modus*, pp. 224–227, who asserts that the principal verb has no influence whatever on the choice of the negative with the participle, but that this choice depends entirely on the nature of the participle itself.² This view, however, is not accepted by other grammarians, and our investiga-

¹Cf. Kühner, § 515, 3, 2; Bäumlein, p. 295.

²See page 227, where he says: "Dem satz in welchem sie stehen für sich kann kein influss zugestanden werden."



tion will show that the principle stated above is correct. Of course, when the participle is only loosely connected with the main sentence, or is remote from the principal verb, or where ὅτι or ὡς intervenes, an original *οὐ* may be retained.

Having thus, by our discussion of these preliminary points, shown the place that *μή* with the participle holds in the development of the negatives, we turn now to a detailed examination of the actual occurrences of this construction in classical Greek, following the two broad lines just laid down: (1) where the participle forms part of a sentence that demands *μή*, and (2) where the participle by the nature of its own predication takes *μή*.

I.

Mή WITH THE PARTICIPLE, THE PRINCIPAL VERB BEING EXPRESSED.

1. *In Imperative Sentences.*

Following the course of the development of *μή* as already traced (pp. 9 f.), let us see first to what extent the participle is used as the representative of the imperative sentence and how far the force of the principal verb extends when the participle is not capable of being resolved into another imperative.

In all there are about one hundred and thirty-eight participles negated by *μή* that form a more or less integral part of an imperative clause. They may be divided for the sake of convenience into five classes: First, where the participle agrees with the subject of the principal verb and may in most cases be resolved into another imperative; secondly, where the participle is in the genitive absolute, either with or without *ὡς*; thirdly, where the participle is in the predicate, either taking the place of an object clause or agreeing with the object of the verb; fourthly, where the imperative appears in an indirect form, i. e., after verbs like *κελεύω*, *παρατινῶ*, etc., and the participle is connected with the subordinate clause. This really belongs under the head of the infinitive, but as being an indirect form of the imperative it may be included here. The fifth class embraces

those participles that cannot conveniently be included under the other heads.

Of these classes the first is by far the largest, containing eighty-five examples out of the total number. It does not appear in Homer, but two examples are found in Hesiod, i. e., Works and Days, 696, and Shield, 98. The first passage reads:

ἀραῖος δὲ γυναῖκα τεὸν ποτὶ οἰκου ἄγεσθαι
μήτε τριηκόντων ἐτέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπων
μήτ' ἐπιθεὶς μάλα πολλά.

ἄγεσθαι is equivalent to an imperative. The other passage is similar.

(Such cases as Hom., Od., III, 96, *μηδέ τι μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο μηδὲ ἐλεαίρων*, have not been included, as here the negatives go with the verb and not with the participles. For similar examples, however, cf. Od., II, 231; Soph., Antig., 267; Eurip., Hecuba, 373; Plato, Politicus, 264 A. We have also excluded passages like Xen., Mem., I, 4, 1, *σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἀ ἔκεινος ἐρωτῶν ἥλεγχεν—ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀ λέγων συνημέρευε—δοκιμαζόντων*, as here the position of the negative shows that it belongs to the following substantive idea and not so much to the participle. For similar examples, cf. Hdt., IV, 46; Aeschines, III, 255; Plato, Crito, 47 D; Phaedrus, 260 C; Menex., 247 B; Rep., IV, 464 C; VII, 534 C; Laws, VII, 817 C. Moreover, not only in the case of the imperative, but also in regard to the other constructions that follow, we have omitted those examples in which the negative precedes both participle and verb and goes with both of them, e. g., in a purpose clause, Thuc., III, 22, 2: *διέχοντες πολὺ ἥσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὅπλα μὴ κρουόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αἰσθησιν παρέχοι.*)

In lyric poetry, especially in the hortatory elegies of Tyrtæus and Theognis, the construction is more frequently employed than in Epic poetry. Eight examples have been noted, e. g., Pindar, Pythia, IV, 176 f.:

ἐχθίστοισι μὴ ψεύδεσιν καταμιάναις εἰπὲ γένναν.

Of the tragedians, Aeschylus and Sophocles make but slight use of the participle as a substitute for the imperative. The

former has but two examples, the latter but three. Note Soph., Electra, 1014 :

αὐτὴ δὲ νοῦν σχέσι ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ,
σθένουσα μηδέν, τοῖς κρατοῦσιν εἰκαθεῖν.

The participle is causal, but owing to the preceding imperative (and possibly also to the following infinitive), the negative is *μή*, not *οὐ*.

Euripides is more free in his use of this construction and has sixteen instances of it. In some cases the verb has to be supplied from the context. Cf. Alcestis, 1094 :

ώς μήποτ' ἄνδρα τόνδε νυμφίον καλῶν—

where *aἴνει* is to be supplied from the preceding line. In Heraclidae, 263, *μή* is due to the prohibitive force of the sentence :

ΔΗ. οὔκουν ἐγὼ τῶν ἐνθάδ' εἰμὶ κύριος;
ΚΟ. βλάπτων γ' ἔκείνους μηδέν, ἦν τι σωφρονῆς.

In Comedy, we find a few instances in the minor poets, but none in Aristophanes. Nor does Herodotus or Xenophon, in his historical works, use the construction. Thucydides, however, has seven instances of it, all but one of which occur in speeches. In the other writings of Xenophon seven examples are found, five of which occur in the Cynegeticus, where, however, imperatives and imperative infinitives abound.

Of the orators, Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, Lyeurgus, and Hypereides do not use it at all. Isocrates has four examples, three of which are in the first speech, which is generally regarded as spurious. Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Deinarchus have one each. This small number of passages in the orators in which the imperative is represented by a participle seems rather surprising at first, in view of the large number of imperatives used by them;¹ but we must remember that the orators are not wont to use the imperative at all, except under stress of emotion, and then the pure imperative is more appropriate than a participle, which belongs rather to a leisurely manner of utterance and not to passionate language.

¹ i. e., 2,445, according to Miller, A. J. P., xiii, 402.

Plato bulks largely, and we should expect to find a large number of examples in his works. The total number, however, is only thirty, fifteen of which occur in the Laws. Many dialogues have none at all, many only one. Note especially *Protag.*, 336 C : διαλεγέσθω—μή—μακρὸν λόγον ὑποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἔθέλων διδόναι λόγον. Here ὑποτείνων continues the imperative, while ἐκκρούων and ἔθέλων are merely descriptive participles. Aken, in accordance with his theory, would doubtless say that the difference in the negatives is due to this fact. But we frequently find οὐκ ἔθέλω coalescing into a quasi-compound and remaining unchanged in spite of its surroundings, and to such cause the retention of οὐ here might be due.

Aken, p. 227, quotes *Gorgias*, 463 A, εἰπὲ μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς, as an example of the final participle. It is, however, as far as we can see, nothing more than a continuation of the imperative. Cf. *Politicus*, 269 C : λέγε μηδὲν ἐλλείπων ; ib., 277 E : λέγε μηδὲν ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἀποκυῶν.

In *Laws*, vi, 754 A, we have μή with the participle equivalent to πρὶν ἂν with the finite verb : Μή τοίνυν γιγνώσκοντές γε παρῷμεν αὐτὸ ἄρρητον, μηδὲν διασαφήσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, where μηδὲν διασαφήσαντες = πρὶν ἂν διασαφήσωμεν.

For other examples of this construction, cf. *Aeschylus*, *Sup.*, 209 ; *Eurip.*, *Tro.*, 1166 ; *Hdt.*, ix, 45 ; *Thuc.*, ii, 2, 3 ; 44, 2 ; *Dem.*, xx, 90 ; *Plato*, *Laws*, ii, 653 B.

For convenience of reference, and also to show at a glance the range of a construction, a complete list of the passages in which that construction is found is appended to each section, unless all the passages have been cited in the treatment of that section. For the construction just treated we have the following list :

Hesiod : Op. et D., 696 f. Scutum, 98.	Mimnermus : vii, 1 f.	Pindar : Pythia, iv, 100 (176).
Tyrtæus : x, 14. xii, 44. xv, 5.	Theognis : 283, 364, 764.	Aeschylus : Agam., 510, 906.

Sophocles:	Thueydides:	Plato:
Electra, 1014. O. R., 310. O. C., 489.	I, 124, 2. II, 87, 8. III, 40, 7, 48, 1. IV, 17, 3. V, 20, 2. VII, 77, 5.	Theæt., 153 E. Sophistes, 239 B, 240 A, 242 B. Politicus, 263 E, 269 C, 277 E. Philebus, 14 B, 28 D, 58 D.
Euripides:	Xenophon:	Laches, 189 B. Protag., 336 C. Gorgias, 463 A.
Alcestis, 1094. Hec., 874. Heraclidæ, 175, 263, 619. H. F., 505, 1110. Iph. Au., 140, 409, 818.	Cyr., III, 1, 37. VII, 5, 20. Cyn., II, 1. IV, 5. VI, 10, 14. X, 12.	Hip. Maior, 398 D. Rep., II, 361 C. Laws, VI, 754 A. VII, 818 E. VIII, 828 B, 844 A, D, 849 E.
Medea, 1122. Or., 657. Tro., 723. Phœ., 1234. Frag., 286, 4, 779.	Isocrates: I, 13, 17, 42. III, 57.	IX, 868 C, 871 A, 879 D, 882 B. X, 887 C. XI, 919 D, 932 C. XII, 943 C, 958 E.
Comici Minores: Pherecrates, 80. Strattis, 37. Antiphanes, 52, 14. (Menander, 128, 3.) ¹ Demonax, 2.	Demosthenes: XXII, 47.	
	Aeschines: III, 247.	
	Deinarchus: III, 20.	

Our second division of *μή* with the participle in imperative sentences is that in which the participle appears in the genitive absolute. This class is much smaller than the preceding, and does not invariably take *μή*, *οὐ*, in fact, being found almost as frequently. This is doubtless due in most cases to the fact that the genitive absolute is not felt to be as closely connected with the principal verb as when the participle agrees with the subject. In other cases we can see special reasons for the retention of *οὐ*.

The genitive absolute in this construction is generally preceded by *ώς*, but one exception to this rule being noted, i. e., Hdt., VII, 10 δ: *σὺ ὁν μὴ βούλευ ἐσ κίνδυνον μηδένα τοιοῦτον ἀπικέσθαι, μηδεμιῆς ἀνάγκης ἐσύσης, ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ πείθευ*. Here the participle is temporal or causal—"When or since there is no necessity," hence *μή* must be due to the force of the imperative.

¹ The examples from the New Comedy have been cited for the sake of completeness. They have not been counted, however, in making up the totals.

For an example with ως, cf. Aristoph., Frogs, 128 :

HPA. *βούλει κατάντη καὶ ταχεῖάν σοι φράσω;*
ΔΙΟ. *νὴ τὸν Δί' ως ὄντος γε μὴ βαδιστικοῦ.*

Here we must supply *φράξε* from the preceding line. *μή*, it is true, goes with *βαδιστικοῦ*, but it is a good example of the influence of the imperative. For other examples, cf. Thuc., VII, 15, 1 (bis); 77, 7; Xen., Cyr., I, 6, 11; Plato, Phædo, 77 E : *ώς δεδιότων (ἡμῶν) — πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ως ἡμῶν δεδιότων.* Here the whole phrase *μὴ ως ἡμῶν δεδιότων* is contrasted with the preceding *ώς δεδιότων*. Hence the position of the negative. For other examples in Plato, cf. Char., 176 B; Rep., I, 327 C; Laws, XI, 915 E; (Menander, 492). This construction is conversational, the example from the Laws being the only exception. Hence we are not surprised to find that it does not occur in the Orators. In the four examples that follow, *ώς οὐ* with the participle is connected with an imperative. In three of the cases the imperative follows, and its force is felt less than if it preceded. It must be noticed also that *ώς* with the participle is virtually a form of *oratio obliqua*, and as such its natural negative is *οὐ*, not *μή*.¹ This may help to account for the retention of *οὐ* here. The passages are as follows : Eurip., Medea, 1311 :

ώς οὐκέτ' ὄντων τῶν τέκνων φρόντιζε δῆ.

Here also the negative of fact may be retained, as is commonly done when speaking of the dead. Xen., Mem., II, 6, 32 : *ώς οὐ προσοίσοντος τὰς χεῖρας — δίδασκε*, where a whole line intervenes between the participle and the principal verb; ib., Cyr., VIII, 4, 27 : *ώς ἀναμενούντος καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανουμένου οὕτω παρασκευάζουν.* Plato, Apol., 30 B : *ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ως ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα.* In this latter case the force of the assertion is evident.

In the third class are included those cases in which the participle appears as the object of an imperative, generally of a verb of saying and thinking. The participle frequently takes the place of an object clause, and hence, owing to the peculiarity of the

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, Justin Martyr, I, 4, 19.

Greek idiom, may be in the nominative when its subject is the same as that of the principal verb. When not used as an object clause, it agrees with the object of the verb. *ώς* is sometimes used with the participle, but more frequently not.

The first example noted is in Aeschylus, Sup., 209 :

ὦ Ζεῦ, κόπων οἴκτιρε μὴ ἀπολωλότας,

where *μὴ ἀπολωλότας* seems to be equal to *πρὶν ἀπολέσαι*. Another example is found in Agam., 932 :

γνώμην μὲν ἵσθι μὴ διαφθεροῦντ' ἐμέ.

In Persæ, 435, *νῦν τόδ' ἵσθι μηδέπω μεσοῦν κακόν*, it is hard to decide whether we have the participle or the infinitive, as both have the same form. Bäumlein, however, p. 268, takes it as the participle.

Sophocles has five examples of this construction, four of which have *ώς*. The passages are Antig., 1063, 1064; O. C., 1155; Phil., 253, 415. The last example is as follows :

ώς μηκέτ' ὅντα κεῖνον ἐν φάει νόει.

Cf. Hdt., III, 65, where the same construction occurs, and where Stein, groundlessly it seems to me, objects to *μή*.

Euripides has but four examples of the participle so used, of which the most noteworthy is Heraclidæ, 693 :

ΙΟ. μή τοί μ' ἔρυκε δρᾶν παρεσκευασμένον,

ΘΕ. δρᾶν μὲν σύ γ' οὐχ οἶός τε, βούλεσθαι δ' ἵσως.

ΙΟ. ὡς μὴ μενοῦντα τāλλα σοι λέγειν πάρα.

Here Reiske, quoted by Elmsley, makes the participle depend on *ἔρυκε*; others supply *ἵσθι*; but Elmsley and most editors take the participle as the accusative absolute. We still, however, have to explain *μή*, and the explanation is doubtless found in the imperative tone of the sentence. Cf. Thuc., VI, 40, 1 : *τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγγελιῶν ὡς πρὸς αἰσθομένους καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀπαλλάγητε*, where *μή* seems to be due to the same cause. Cf. Classen's note. But on the other hand in Rhesus 145 (which, however, is generally regarded as not by Euripides) we find :

σάλπιγγος αὐδὴν προσδοκῶν καραδόκει
ώς οὐ μενοῦντά με.

These examples seem to show that in the case of the accusative absolute, as in that of the genitive absolute, the same choice of negatives is permitted.

If Ion 313 belongs under this head we have to supply the imperative from the preceding line, as in the case of Aristoph., Frogs, 128,

KP. *ἡμεῖς σ' ἄρ' αὐθις, ω̄ ξέν' ἀντοικτίρομεν.*

IΩN. *ώσ μὴ εἰδόθ' ήτις μ' ἔτεκεν ἐξ ὅτου τ' ἔφυν.*

“Yes; pity me who know neither mother nor father.”

The historians, orators, and Plato make but little use of this construction, which belongs apparently to the language of the drama. The complete list of occurrences is as follows :

Aeschylus: Sup., 209. Agam., 932. Persae, 435.	Tragici Minores: Frag. incert., 122, quoted by Dem., XVIII, 267.	Xenophon: Cyn. IX, 15.
Sophocles: O. C., 1155. Antig., 1063, 1064. Phil., 253, 415.	Comici Minores: Antiphanes, 177. (Philemon the younger, 1, 2.)	Isocrates: v, 133.
Euripides: Androm., 726. Heraclidæ, 693, 982. Ion, 313.	Herodotus: III, 65. VIII, 144.	Demosthenes: XXVII, 59. LV, 35.
	Thucydides: I, 141, 1.	Aeschines: I, 161. Plato: Gorgias, 488 B.

Μή is not invariably found in this construction. Indeed, as the participle here is a form of *oratio obliqua* we should rather expect to find *οὐ* than *μὴ*, and it seems to point to the strong influence of the imperative that so many of the cases have *μὴ* and so few *οὐ* (see page 19). An example with *οὐ* has already been cited from [Euripides] Rhesus, 145. Others are Soph. Phil., 567 :

ώσ ταῦτ' ἐπίστω δρώμεν' οὐ μέλλοντ' ἔτι.

Thuc., I, 36, 1 : *γνώτω—οὐ—βουλόμενος καὶ οὐ προνοῶν.* Here three lines intervene between the principal verb and the participles, and hence *οὐ* is retained ; ib., I, 122, 2 : *ἴστω οὐκ ἄλλο τι*

φέρουσαν η ἄντκρυς δουλείαν. Demos., xxii, 29: η δεῖξον οὐ πεποιηκότα ταῦτα σαυτόν, η δίκην ὑπεχε.

We see then from these few passages that, although *οὐ* is permitted with the participle in this construction, the tendency is to assimilate the negative to that of the imperative.

Our fourth class includes what we have called the indirect imperative, i. e., where the participle forms part of an infinitive clause after verbs of exhortation or command, e. g., *παραινῶ*, *κελεύω*, &c. The first example noted is in Euripides, Frag., 317:

καὶ νῦν παραινῶ πᾶσι τοῖς νεωτέροις
μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἀποβολὰς ποιουμένοις,
σχολῇ τεκνοῦσθαι παῖδας.

Aristoph., Clouds, 966, is a good example:

εἰτ' αὐτὸν προμαθεῖν ἀσμ' ἐδίδασκεν τῷ μηρῷ μὴ ξυνέχοντας.

Other examples are, Hdt., I, 80, 170; Thuc., I, 82, 1; 90, 3; IV, 38, 3; 98, 8; VIII, 14, 1; Xen. Anab., IV, 3, 28; Dem., xv, 9; (LIX, 75): *νόμον ἔθεντο ἀστὴν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐπιμειγμένην ἐτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ*; Plato, Laws, III, 702 C; VII, 810 E; XI, 930 B. Hence, we see that the construction belongs chiefly to prose. In one or two cases *οὐ* seems to be used contrary to the general rule, cf. Hdt., IX, 122: *αὐτοῖσι παραίνεε κελεύων παρασκευάζεσθαι ως οὐκέτι ἄρξοντας ἀλλ' ἄρξομένους*; also Thuc., I, 28, 1; *ἐκέλευον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ φρούρους τε καὶ οἰκήτορας ἀπάγειν, ως οὐ μετὸν αὐτοῖς Ἐπιδάμνου*, cf. Morris' note.

It is to be noticed that in both of these instances the participle is preceded by *ως* while in all the examples cited above have the simple participle. Perhaps this has something to do with the retention of *οὐ*. In the latter case also we have the accusative absolute which, as we have already seen, permits *οὐ* after an imperative.

A few passages still remain to be discussed in which *μή* is apparently due to the force of the imperative, but which cannot well be classed under any of the above heads. So Euripides, Hipp., 306:

ἀλλ' ἵσθι μέντοι, πρὸς τάδ' αὐθαδεστέρα
γίγνονται θαλάσσης, εἰ θανεῖ, προδοῦσα σοὺς
παιδας πατρώων μὴ μεθέξοντας δόμων,

The *μή* may be due to the preceding imperative, and is so explained by Lodge, Participle in Euripides, p. 20, but the participle

seems rather to express result, and Barthold suggests that *μή* may depend on some subordinate idea, as *ώστε μὴ μεθέξειν αὐτούς*. This is at least possible.

Xen., Cyn., vi, 5: *τὴν δὲ στολὴν ὁ ἀρκυωρὸς ἐξίτω ἔχων ἐπὶ θήραν μὴ ἔχουσαν βάρος.* The force of the imperative is evident here, and also in Antiphon, III, δ, 10: *μήτε οὖν ἡμᾶς εἰς μὴ προσηκούσας συμφορὰς ἐμβάλητε.* Cf. also Plato, Laws, VIII, 833 E; 847 B.

This, then, finishes our treatment of *μή* with the participle in the imperative sentence. We see that the force of the principal verb is very frequently sufficient to produce *μή* in the subordinate clause, even when the participle cannot be resolved into another imperative. A few exceptions have been noted, but their number is small in comparison with those that take *μή*, and many of them admit of a satisfactory explanation on other grounds.

Putting the results of the preceding pages into a tabular form, we get the following table, showing the use of *μή* with the participle in imperative sentences:

AUTHORS.	PTC. AGREEING WITH SUBJECT.	GEN. ABS.	PTC. AGREEING WITH OBJECT.	INDIRECT.	MISCEL- LANEOUS.	
Homer.....						
Hesiod.....	2					2
Lyric Poets, not includ- ing Pindar...	7					7
Pindar.....	1					1
Aeschylus.....	2		3			5
Sophocles.....	3		5			8
Euripides.....	16		4	1	1	22
Tragici Minores.....			1			1
Aristophanes...		1		1		2
Comici Minores.....	3+(2) ¹		1+(2) ¹			4+(4) ¹
Herodotus.....		1	2	2		5
Thucydides....	7	3	1	5		16
Xenophon.....	7	1	1	1	1	11
Orators.....	7		4	2	1	14
Plato.....	30	4	1	3	2	40
Totals.....	85+(2) ¹	10	23+(2) ¹	15	5	188+(4) ¹

¹ From the New Comedy.

2. *In Optative Sentences.*

From the imperative we pass next to *μή* with the participle in wishes, including both the optative and the past tenses of the indicative. The dividing line between the optative and the imperative is often very faint. As the imperative may express a command, an exhortation, and an entreaty, so the optative may express varying shades of feeling from that which comes very close to a command to the most humble prayer (cf. p. 9). The negative of this independent optative is *μή*. Hence a participle that represents such an optative or forms an integral part of a clause depending on it must also be negatived by *μή*. Examples of participles so used are not very numerous, but they are found in all periods of the language from Homer on. They fall most readily into two classes: first where the principal verb is in the optative or indicative and the participle either agrees with the subject, or the object, or some subordinate word, and secondly where the participle forms part of an infinitive clause after verbs of praying and wishing, *εύχομαι*, *βούλομαι*, etc. We take them up in this order.

The single passage in Homer in which this construction is found is Od., iv, 684 :

*μὴ μνηστεύσαντες μηδ' ἄλλοθ' ὄμιλήσαντες
ὕστατα καὶ πύματα νῦν ἐνθάδε δειπνήσειαν.*

“ May they (after their wooing) have no other meeting, but dine here now for the last time.” Monro.¹

There is another passage somewhat similar to this in Od., xi, 613 :

μὴ τεχνησάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο,

where, however, *μή* does not go with *τεχνησάμενος* but merely, as a sort of free negative, serves to introduce the whole sentencee.

Hesiod has three examples of this construction, Works and Days, 444, 489, 591 ; 444 is as follows :

*τοῖς δ' ἄμα τεσσαρακονταετής αἰζηὸς ἔποιτο,
ὅς κ' ἔργου μελετῶν ιθεῖαν αὐλακ' ἐλαύνοι,
μηκέτι παπταίνων μεθ' ὄμήλικας.*

¹ For full discussion of the passage see Ameis-Hentze, Anhang, and Aken, p. 38.

The generic sentence that intervenes may also have some influence on the choice of the negative.

Theognis is the only one of the lyric poets who uses the participle with *μή* in this construction. In 1154 and 1156 he has two examples :

*εἴη μοι πλουτεῦντι κακῶν ἀπάτερθε μεριμνέων
ζώειν ἀβλαβέως μηδὲν ἔχοντι κακόν.*

The other example is similar.

Neither Aeschylus nor Sophocles has any instances of the participle so used. Euripides, Alcestis, 536, shows still another position of the participle :

εἴθ' ηὔρομεν σ' "Αδμητε, μὴ λυπούμενον.

Euripides has seven more examples, Aristophanes one, Lysias one, Demosthenes two, if we include xxiv, 171, δι' ἀ πολλῷ/ἄν εἰκότως μὴ θελήσαντες ἀκοῦσαι σοῦ θάνατον καταψηφίσαινθ' οὗτοι ή δι' 'Ανδροτίων' ἀφείησαν, where *μή* seems to be due to the general optative tone running through the whole sentence. Or, if this explanation is not satisfactory, we may adopt that employed in somewhat similar cases by Spieker in A. J. P., vi, 323, and take *μή* with the following infinitive. Plato has but one example, Laws, vii, 823 E.

The complete list of occurrences is as follows :

Homer: Od. iv, 684.	Euripides: Alcestis, 536. Iph. Tau., 518, 535. Ion, 632. Or., 1580. Frag., 201. 360, 27, 399.	(Diphilus, 73, 9 = Eurip. Iph. Tau., 535).
Hesiod: Op. et D., 444, 489, 591.	Aristophanes: Plutus, 892.	Lysias: xxiv, 26.
Theognis: 1154, 1156.	Comici Minores: Eubulus, 72.5 = Incert., 155.	Demosthenes: xx, 109, xxiv, 171.
		Plato: Laws, vii, 823 E.

The wish, as is well known, is characteristic of Euripides, and we have a confirmation of it here. Notice the entire absence of the construction from the historians and, indeed, its small use in prose generally; but, then, prose writers have little opportunity of using this optative, so that their small use of the participle in this construction is not surprising after all.

In Euripides, *Helena*, 730, *οὐ* seems to be employed contrary to the general rule :

ἔγὼ μὲν εἴην, κεὶ πέφυχ' ὅμως λάτρις
ἐν τοῖς γενναίοισιν ἡριθμημένος
δούλοισι, τούνομ' οὐκ ἔχων ἐλεύθερον
τὸν νοῦν δέ.

The participial clause is not felt as an integral part of the wish, hence the negative of fact is retained.

Under the second head are included those passages in which the participle forms part of a clause depending on verbs of praying and wishing. Again, as in the case of the indirect imperative, we have, strictly speaking, a subdivision of the infinitive construction, but the general optative tone of the sentences warrants us in classifying them under this head. The first instance of the construction is in Pindar, *Pythia*, IV, 297 : *εὔχεται—οἰκον* *ἰδεῖν—μήτ'* *ὤν τινι πῆμα πορών, ἀπαθῆς δ' αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀστῶν.*

The next is Soph., O. C., 1509 :

θέλω πόλιν τε τήνδε μὴ ψεύσας θανεῖν.

Other examples are Eurip., *Iph. Au.*, 378 (*βούλομαι*); Aristoph., *Knights*, 766 (*εὔχομαι*); Lys., 474 (*θέλω*); Thuc., II, 2, 3, *ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν—ἔτι ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μήπω φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος, προσκαταλαβεῖν*. The participial clause is part of the wish and is equivalent to *πρίν* with the infinitive; ib., VIII, 92, 11 (*οὐκ ἥθελον*): Xen., *Cyr.*, I, 4, 26 (*βούλομαι*); Hell., VI, 2, 39 (*βούλομαι*); Lysias, VIII, 2 (*βούλοιμην ἄν*); Isoc., VI, 8 (*έλοιμην ἄν*); Dem., XV, 12 (*βούλομαι*); Aeschines, II, 7 (*δέομαι*); Plato, *Laches*, 195 A (*ἐπιθυμεῖν*).

In tabular form the use of *μή* with the participle in wishes appears as follows :

AUTHORS.	DIRECT.	INDIRECT.
Homer.....	1	...
Hesiod.....	3	...
Lyric Poets, not including Pindar.....	2	...
Pindar.....	...	1
Aeschylus.....
Sophocles.....	...	1
Euripides.....	8	1
Aristophanes.....	1	2
Comici Minores.....	1	...
Herodotus.....
Thucydides.....	...	2
Xenophon.....	...	2
Orators.....	3	4
Plato.....	1	1
Total.....	20	14

3. *With Verbs of Swearing.*

Closely allied with the use of *μή* in expressions of a wish is its use with verbs of swearing, in which the will of the speaker is also exerted. In a very few passages, four or five in all, we find the participle forming part of an infinitive clause after such verbs. This construction is again but a subdivision of the use of the participle with the infinitive, which will be treated later, but its connection with the indirect optative just discussed is sufficient excuse for placing it here.

Pindar, Nemea, vii, 71, furnishes the first example :

ἀπομνύω

*μὴ τέρμα προβὰς ἄκονθ' ὅτε χαλκοπάραον ὅρσαι
θοὰν γλῶσσαν.*

It is true that there is a variant reading here, i. e., *ἀπομνύω*, which Christ adopts and which would cause *μή* to be taken with *ὅρσαι*. Bergk and Bury, however, accept the reading given, which, on the whole, seems to be preferable. The other passages in which the construction occurs are Eurip., Iph. Tau., 739; Aristoph., Wasps, 1281; Antiphon, vi, 16. In Xen., Cyr., vi, 1, 3, *μή* goes with both participle and verb—*ἀπώμοσεν ή μὴν μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Τστάσπου πεισθεὶς ταῦτα γιγνώσκειν*. In Antiphon, i, 28, there is some doubt as to the correct reading : *τὸ διομόσασθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς*

εὐ εἰδέναι μὴ πεποιηκυῖαν ταῦτα. This is the reading of Blass following Cobet. The MSS., however, have **πεποιηκέναι**, which Maetzner retains.

The rarity of the participle in this construction is doubtless due to the fact that verbs of swearing are not very frequently employed by the classical writers, and hence opportunities for using it are infrequent.

4. *In Final Sentences.*

Having thus far treated the participle with **μή** as the representative of the imperative, the wish, and the oath, all of which are capable of being expressed as independent sentences, we turn now to its use in dependent sentences. Here, as we have already seen (p. 10), **μή** is the negative when the clause expresses finality, or condition, or depends on an infinitive. A participle that belongs to such sentences must also be negatived by **μή**.

Let us first take up the final sentence, including besides the pure final, object clauses after verbs of striving for or effecting, and after verbs of fear.

The number of participles so used is not very large, and they do not appear before the time of *Æschylus*. In the majority of cases the final particle is expressed, but in some **μή** seems to be due to the general idea of purpose running through the whole sentence. The first example noted is *Æschylus, Prometheus*, 824 :

ὅπως δ' ἀν εἰδῆ μὴ μάτην κλύνουσά μου.

In Soph., *Ajax*, 472, the particle is not expressed and **μή** must depend on the general idea of purpose :

πεῖρά τις ζητητέα
τοιάδ' ἀφ' ἡς γέρουντι δηλώσω πατρὶ¹
μή τοι φύσιν γ' ἀσπλαγχνος ἐκ κείνου γεγώς.

Examples of object clauses are, Xen., *Cyr.*, VIII, 1, 42: **έμελέτησε ώς μὴ πτύοντες μηδὲ ἀπομυττόμενοι φανερὸι εἰεν**, μηδὲ **μεταστρεφόμενοι ἐπὶ θέαν μηδενός, ώς οὐδὲν θαυμάζοντες.** The clause with **ώς** is not felt as an integral part of the sentence, and hence **οὐ** is retained. Ib., *Rep.*, *Lac.*, VI, 1; *Isoc.*, VI, 94; ib., XXI, 13: **ῶστε μὴ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι Νικίᾳ ὅπως συκοφαντῶν τὰλλότρια λήψοιτο ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν κακόν τι πείσοιτο.**

This is the reading of Bekker, Müller and Baiter. Blass reads ὅπως μὴ οὐδέν κτέ. The MSS. have simply ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικῶν. The sense seems to require the participle to be negated, and *μηδέν* seems to be more natural than *οὐδέν*; and it is easier to see how *μή* could be dropped before *μηδέν* than before *οὐδέν*. Other examples of the object clause are: Dem., v, 13; VIII, 13; (x, 41); Plato, Laws, vi, 770 D.

Of *μή* with the participle forming part of a clause depending on a verb of fear but one example has been noted, i. e., Plato, Char., 166 D: *φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή.* *οὐ* properly follows *μή* after verbs of fear (cf. Thuc., VII, 25, 7: *δεινόν—μὴ οὐ προιδών τις, ὡσπερ περὶ ἔρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν,* where *οὐ* belongs only to the participle), but *μή* is sometimes found,¹ and this passage seems to be an instance of this construction.

In (Theages, 122 C) the participle forms part of a cautious assertion, the verb not being expressed. Cf. Antiphon, v, 75. The list of passages in which the participle forms part of a final clause is as follows:

Aeschylus: Pro., 824.	Xenophon: Anab., VII, 2, 33. Cyr., IV, 6, 11. VIII, 1, 42. Rep. Lac., VI, 1. Cyn. x, 1.	Demosthenes: v, 13. VIII, 13. (x, 41). (xvii, 2). XIX, 38. xx, 136. XXIV, 28. (lxI, 10).
Sophocles: Ajax, 472. O. R., 1389. O. C., 1279.	Isocrates: VI, 94. XVII, 47. XXI, 13.	Plato: Alcib., I, 122 A. (Theages, 122 C.) Char., 166 D. Euthyd., 304 A. Laws, vi, 770 D.
Herodotus: IV, 139. IX, 45.	Isaeus: V, 5. VIII, 4.	
Thucydides: IV, 67, 4.		

As in the preceding classes, so in this, *οὐ* is occasionally found where we should expect *μή*, but it can generally be explained on the principle of adhaerescence. So Soph., Electra, 584:

εἰσόρα μὴ σκῆψιν οὐκ οὖσαν τίθησ.

¹ Cf. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 306.

Also Eurip., *Phoe.*, 1319 :

οὐ πως
λούσῃ προθῆται τ' οὐκέτ' ὅντα παῖδ' ἐμόν.

οὐ is regular when speaking of the dead. Hdt. I, 99 : *ὅκως ἀν μὴ ὄρῶντες οἱ ὁμήλικες, ὅντες—οἰκίης οὐ φλαυροτέρας οὐδὲ ἐς ἀνδραγαθίην λειπόμενοι, λυπεοίατο.*

οὐ φλαυροτέρας can be explained by adhaerescence, then *οὐδέ* follows as a matter of course. Thuc., VIII, 45, 2 : *ἴνα αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ ναῦται—τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες τὸν μισθόν.* The MSS. vary in regard to *οὐχ*—some omitting it, others retaining it, and still others having *μή* on the margin. The majority of editors retain *οὐχ*—which may be explained on the ground of the causal nature of the participle and its distance from *μή* and *ἴνα*. Dem. XXIX, 46 (cited by Aken, p. 229), seems to be a real exception : *ἴν' ἐξ εἰκότος οὐδὲν προσῆκον ἡμῖν φανῆ.* The other passage cited by Aken, i. e., Dem. Proem., v, is easily explained as above. It reads : *ἴνα—δὶ’ αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δὶ’ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν τοῦτο πεπονθέναι δοκῆ.*

5. *In Conditional Clauses with εἰ and the finite Verb expressed.*

Next after the final sentence we take up the use of *μή* with the participle in the conditional proposition. There are two broad divisions—First, where the conditional particle and the finite verb are expressed, the participle serving to introduce some parallel or subordinate idea, and secondly, where the participle itself forms the protasis of a conditional proposition. The latter is much the larger class and constitutes the main development of *μή* with the participle. But at present we are only treating those cases of the participle in which the principal verb is expressed, so that we must now confine ourselves to the former class.

About two hundred and seventy-nine instances of this construction have been noted. The first example is in the *Odyessy*, but it does not occur again until Sophocles, after whom, however, it is found very frequently in all departments of the language. As the conditional sentence belongs largely to argumentative dis-

course, so our construction abounds in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, the orators, and some of the dialogues of Plato.

The participle appears in a variety of forms, sometimes in the nominative agreeing with the subject of the principal verb, sometimes as genitive absolute, sometimes as object of the verb. Aken, true to his theory that the principal verb does not influence the participle, is often put to great straits to explain the negative. So in respect to Xen., Mem., III, 5, 23, *ἐάν τι αἴσθη σαντὸν μὴ εἰδότα*, he says : "nicht wegen *ἐάν*, sondern weil der acc. c. ptc. einem acc. c. inf. gleich steht; ist es möglich gewählt aber weil der sinn ist *ἐάν τι μὴ εἰδῆς καὶ αἴσθη*," and in respect to Dem. XXXI, 5, he says : "*εἰ φανείη μὴ λέγων = εἰ μὴ λέγοι*."

As this class presents but few difficulties, after citing some examples by way of illustration, we shall simply give the complete list of occurrences in order to show its range.

The first example noted is in *Odyssey*, I, 289, which is repeated in II, 220 :

εἰ δέ κε τεθνηώτος ἀκούσης, μηδ' ἔτι ἐόντος.

The next example is Soph., *Ajax*, 1317 :

*ἄναξ Ὁδυσσεῦ, καιρὸν ἵσθ' ἐληλυθώς,
εἰ μὴ ξυνάψων, ἀλλὰ συλλύσων πάρει.*

The participles here express purpose, and *μή* might possibly be due to this cause, but the other explanation is simpler and better.

Notice again *Trach.*, 411 :

ΑΓ. *ποίαν ἀξιοῖς δοῦναι δίκην,*
 ἢν εὑρεθῆς ἐς τήνδε μὴ δίκαιος ὡν;
ΑΙ. *πῶς μὴ δίκαιος;*

Here *μὴ δίκαιος* are to be taken together, as the answer shows, but the example well illustrates the force of the preceding condition. Notice the following passages also, in which *μή* seems to depend on the condition, although such dependence in all the cases is not really clear. Eurip., *Androm.*, 845 :

ἀλλ' εἰ σ' ἀφείην μὴ φρονοῦσαν, ὡς θάνοις ;

Troades, 874 :

κτανεῖν ἐμοί νιν ἔδοσαν, εἴτε μὴ κτανῶν
θέλοιμ' ἄγεσθαι πάλιν ἐς Ἀργείων χθόνα.

Xen., Hell., I, 7, 19 : συμβουλεύω δ' ὑμῖν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξαπατηθῆναι ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας εἰδότες κολάσεσθε ἢ ἀνθούλησθε δίκη—εἰ μὴ πλέον ἀλλὰ καν μίαν ἡμέραν δόντες αὐτοῖς—ἀπολογήσασθαι, μὴ ἄλλοις πιστεύοντες ἢ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.

In Hdt., VII, 10 ζ, the participle seems to be used instead of the finite verb : ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπισχεῖν ἔνεστι ἀγαθά, εἰ μὴ παραντίκα δοκέοντα εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀνὰ χρόνον ἔξενροι τις ἄν. Cf. Stein's note.

In pseudo-Lysias, xx, 20, the position of the negative deserves notice : εἰ τις τῶν ἐνθάδε μὴ τὰ ἄριστα λέγων πείθει ὑμᾶς. μὴ may be taken with λέγων or with τὰ ἄριστα = τὰ μὴ ἄριστα. Cf. §§ 5 and 10, where the same construction occurs and where μὴ undoubtedly depends on the principal verb. But see Dem. (xxvi, 21) : ὡς πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ—πάλιν ἐκολάσατε, where there seems to be no other explanation than τὰ μὴ ἄριστα. The whole phrase is a legal formula, and occurs in the speech of Hypereides, Pro Euxenippo, several times, and in every instance μὴ depends on the general idea of the sentence. Cf. Col. xviii : ὁ δὲ ρήτωρ ὅν (αἰτίαν ἔχει) λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ ; Col. xx : περὶ τοῦ λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ ; Col. xxxix : εἰσαγγελίαν ἔγραψα—ρήτορα ὅντα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ ; but in Col. xl we have τάδ' εἰπεν οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ. In view of these examples, therefore, it seems better in the passage from Lysias to take μὴ with λέγων as conditional, rather than with τὰ ἄριστα as generic.

The complete list of the passages in which μὴ with the participle forming part of a conditional proposition occurs is as follows :

Homer:	Euripides:	Aristophanes:
Od., I, 289.	Androm., 845. Ion, 1301.	Clouds, 415. Wasps, 1119.
Sophocles:	Med., 242. Or., 1174. 1198.	Lys., 1112.
Ajax, 1317. O. C., 976. Trach., 411.	Tro., 874. Frag., 313.	Plutus, 910.

Comici Minores:	Antiphon:	II, 1. VII, 2. IX, 7.
Eupolis, 357, 4.	I, 10.	
Anaxandrides, 52, 7.	II, δ, 7.	
(Men., 325, 15.)	III, β, 5,	
Euphro, 10, 14.	γ, 9, 10, δ, 4.	
Herodotus:	IV, δ, 3.	Isaeus:
II, 13.	V, 32.	III, 63, 64.
III, 69.	VI, 19.	VI, 52. VII, 19.
IV, 157.		VIII, 11, 31.
VII, 10 ζ, 50, 139.	Andocides:	IX, 27. X, 23.
VIII, 94.	II, 1, 4,	XI, 19 (bis). 38.
IX, 51.		
Thucydides:	Lysias:	Demosthenes:
III, 14, 1.	I, 38.	II, 23 (bis).
46, 2.	III, 26.	IV, 38.
IV, 18, 5,	IX, 10.	(VII, 45.)
73, 3,	XIII, 75.	VIII, 18.
85, 2.	XIV, 13,	IX, 14.
VI, 23, 1,	22.	(XI, 19.)
38, 4,	XIX, 37.	XVII, 65, 220.
80, 2.	(XX, 20).	XVIII, 201.
VII, 70, 8,	XXV, 4.	XIX, 8, 214, 233, 239, 267.
78, 1.	XXVII, 8.	XX, 24, 43, 46, 113, 137, 139.
Xenophon:	XXXI, 28.	XXI, 51, 100, 128, 134. 186, 206.
Anab., IV, 1, 14.	Isocrates:	XXII, 18, 36, 62.
VII, 6, 27.	(I, 17.)	XXIII, 42, 57, 68, 77, 96, 192, 218.
Cyr., I, 6, 22.	II, 24.	XXIV, 35, 47, 95.
V, 4, 48,	III, 11.	XXV, 38, 99.
5, 13.	IV, 14.	XXVII, 69.
VII, 1, 42.	V, 24,	XXX, 23.
VIII, 1, 32.	29,	XXXI, 5.
Hell., I, 7, 19.	45,	XXXVI, 2, 32.
Mem., I, 2, 29,	81,	XXXVIII, 2.
7, 2,	105.	(XL, 61.)
3.	VIII, 17.	(XLVII, 1.)
II, 6, 4,	XI, 7,	(XLVIII, 2.)
38.	50.	(L, 67.)
III, 1, 2,	XII, 23,	(LII, 2.)
9,	24,	LIV, 43.
5, 23.	269.	
IV, 1, 5,	XIV, 61.	
(five times)	XV, 42,	
2, 17,	90,	
3, 12,	129.	
6, 13.	XVI, 48,	
Oec., II, 15 (bis).	50.	
III, 2,	XVII, 1.	
11.	XVIII, 65.	
De Vec., V, 9,	XIX, 32.	
13.	Epis., I, 9.	



Demosthenes: LV, 33. LVII, 3, 44. (LVIII, 52.) Proem., vi, 1. XXI, 1. XXIII.	Theaet. , 152 D, 162 A, 165 A, 181 B. Politicus , 296 B, D, 300 A. Par. , 136 C, 164 D, 165 E. Philebus , 56 E. Sym. , 178 D. Phaedrus , 259 A. 269 B. (Alcib., II, 142 D.) (Hipp., 226 E.) 231 B.) Char. , 175 E. Laches , 200 E. Euthyd. , 287 A. Gorgias , 460 A, 461 B, 466 E, 482 C, 486 B, 488 A, 514 D, 516 A, 522 D. Meno , 71 D, 85 E, 97 B (bis). Hip. Maior , 292 D. " Min., 372 A.	Ion , 542 A. Menex. , 247 A. Cleitophon , 408 E. Rep. , II, 368 D, 370 E. III, 393 D. IV, 429 E. V, 461 B, 478 D. VI, 492 A. 493 B, 499 E. IX, 579 C. Laws , I, 638 C, II, 653 B, 658 A, 660 C, 663 D. IV, 705 E. VI, 762 A, C. VIII, 841 E, 844 C, E. 845 A. C. IX, 862 A, 872 C, 874 C. XI, 921 A, 923 D, 924 B, 936 D. XII, 943 A, D.
Aeschines: I, 85 (bis.) 131. II, 5, 88, 163.		
Hypereides: Pro Eux. Col. xxxiii, = § 21.		
Deinarchus: I, 112.		
Plato: Euthyphro, 15 B. Apol., 41 E. Phaedo, 62 C, 80 E. Crat., 439 E.		

We see then from this list that the frequency with which this construction is used depends largely on the nature of the discourse. The dramatists and the historians use it comparatively rarely, while it abounds in the orators and Plato. But these latter writers, from the nature of their writings, have many more opportunities to use the hypothetical proposition, and consequently the participle is more frequently found. In the same author likewise differences are noted. For instance, the Protagoras of Plato does not have any examples of this use of the participle, while the Gorgias has nine.

Here, too, as in the constructions previously treated, *οὐ* is occasionally found, but the instances are very rare in comparison to those in which *μή* is used. The retention of *οὐ* is frequently due to adhaerescence. E. g., Eurip., Iph. Au., 995 :

εἰ δ' οὐ παρούσης ταῦτα τεύξομαι σέθεν,
μενέτω κατ' οἴκους.

Cf. also Dem., xxiv, 48 ; xxix, 38.

In other cases the negative of fact is retained or the sentence is really causal in its nature. Cf. Aristoph., Wasps, 466 :

εἰ σύ γε
τῶν νόμων ἡμᾶς ἀπείργεις
οὔτε τιν' ἔχων πρόφασιν
οὔτε λόγον εὐτράπελον.

Cf. also Thuc., I, 124, 1 ; III, 66, 2 ; Isoc., XII, 120 ; Plato, Sym., 185 B (bracketed by Hug).

Sometimes *οὐ* and *μή* are used in consecutive clauses, without any apparent difference in feeling. Cf. Dem., xxii, 36 : *τῷ γάρ ἐστιν ὄνειδος, εἰ σιωπῶντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν γράφοντος, ἵσως δ' οὐδὲ τὰ πόλλα' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον εἰσιόντος, μὴ λάβοι ἡ βουλὴ τὸν στέφανον.*

ώς with the participle, especially in the genitive absolute, is sometimes found with *οὐ*, although forming part of a conditional sentence. The retention of *οὐ* may be due to the oratio obliqua force of this construction (see p. 19). Examples are Dem., xviii, 207 : *εἰ γάρ, ως οὐ τὰ βέλτιστ' ἐμοῦ πολιτευσαμένου, τουδὶ καταψηφιεῖσθε.* Lysias, XIV, 31 ; Plato, Sym., 183 D.

6. *In the Generic Relative Sentence.*

A relative sentence frequently implies a condition or a generic idea. The negative of this clause is *μή* according to the principle already laid down (pp. 9 f.). A participle that forms an intimate part of such a clause is also negated by *μή*. It is to this class that we now turn our attention under the general head of *μή* with the participle in the generic relative sentence. There are about one hundred and twenty-nine participles so used. The construction does not occur before Theognis. For neither Homer, nor Hesiod, nor Pindar uses it, although both Homer and Pindar have examples of the generic relative with *μή*. Cf. Homer, Il., II, 302 ; Pindar, Pyth., I, 13 ; IX, 94.

The first example in which a participle appears is Theognis, 734 :

ὅστις ἀθειρῆς τεχνάζοιτο θεῶν μηδὲν ὀπιζόμενος.

Æschylus has but a single example, Septem, 3 :

ὅστις φυλάσσει
· · · βλέφαρα μὴ κοιμῶν ὑπνῷ.

Sophocles is also sparing in its use, having but four instances. Euripides, however, uses it more freely, if we include phrases like *ὅτι* or *ἄ μὴ χρεών*, which occur in Bacchæ, 515, 912; Hec., 282; Electra, 223; Frag., 193, 417.

Aristophanes has but two examples. Herodotus but one. Thucydides and Xenophon, in his historical writings, use it more freely. It occurs most frequently in the philosophical works of Xenophon, in the later orators, and Plato.

The following table shows the range and frequency of the construction.

Theognis: 734, 745.	Tragici Min.: Critias, 4.	II, 44, 2. VII, 74, 3. 92, 6.
Aeschylus: Septem, 3.	Aristophanes: Clouds, 619. Frogs, 358.	Xenophon: Anab., IV, 2, 17. Cyr., III, 3, 31. IV, 5, 21. Mem., I, 2, 44. (thrice) 2, 45. (thrice) 7, 5. Hell., II, 3, 7. III, 3, 12. 33. v, 3, 11. Oec., I, 16. Hiero, VII, 9. (Rep. Ath., II, 20.) De Vect., II, 2. Cyn., II, 21.
Sophocles: Ajax, 1094. O. R., 875. O. C., 1186. Trach., 384.	Comici Min.: Antiphanes, 244. Alexis, 269, 2. Men., 628, 640. Philemon, 4, 7, 94, 4. Demoxenus, 2, 13.	Andocides: (iv., 37.)
Euripides: Bacchæ, 515, 912. Hec., 282. Elec., 223. Tro., 1166. Frag., 193, 417, 501, 784, 910, 1049.	Herodotus: VII, 132. VIII, 27.	
	Thueydiades: I, 40, 2. 71, 1.	

Lysias :	xxviii, 21. xxxi, 12. xlvi, 68. (L, 36.) 44. lviii, 51. (lix, 103.) Proem., 1, 3.	Euthyd., 277 E, 306 A. Gorgias, 485 D. Meno, 86 B, 99 C, D. Hip. Mai., 290 C. 302 C. Rep., iii, 379 D, vii, 533 C, viii, 549 D, (bis) ix, 571 E, 572 A, x, 615 E. Tim., 84 B. Laws, iii, 687 E, v, 733 B, 735 E. vi, 753 C. viii, 829 C, 847 C. ix, 855 E, 873 C, 876 B, 880 E, 881 B. x, 885 A, 908 B. xi, 913 C, 924 C, 925 C, 926 A.
Isocrates :	Aeschines :	
v, 26. 29. vi, 61. viii, 22. 139. ix, 6. xiii, 7. xv, 143. xviii, 43. xix, 33.	iii, 226.	
Isaeus :	Plato :	
iii, 35. iv, 19. xi, 29.	Phædo, 65 C. E, 82 D. Theaet., 155 B, 175 E. Soph., 219 B, 230 B, 238 B, C. Polit., 311 C. Philebus, 14 B, Phædrus, 232 D. (Alcib., ii, 147 C.) (Hipp., 231 A.) Laches, 191 A, 193 C. Lysis, 213 C.	
Demosthenes :		
ix, 65. xix, 161. xx, 113. xxi, 109. xxii, 71.		

Some few passages of special interest or importance deserve a few words of comment. So the construction in Thuc., vii, 92, 6 : *ὅστις μὴ βουλομένοις ταῦτα ἦν*. The only other instance of this use of the participle with *μή* is found in Xen., Cyr., iv, 5, 21 : *ὅτῳ ὑμῶν μὴ ἀχθομένῳ εἴη*. In Thuc., ii, 3, 2, *οὐ* is used because a definite body is referred to : *τῷ πλήθει οὐ βουλομένῳ ἦν*.

Pseudo-Andocides, iv, 37, has been included in the above list, although Aken thinks the *μή* inexplicable. The passage reads : *οὐκονν τοὺς τοιούτους δίκαιον ἐκβάλλειν, οὓς πολλάκις ἐλέγχοντες εὑρίσκετε μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας κτέ.* *τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας* is plainly generic, and I can see no objection to explaining *οὓς—μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας* in the same way.

Isaeus, xi, 29, deserves notice : *οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτ' ἐποίησαν οὐδὲ πεχείρησαν, εἰδότες ὅτι, ὅτ' ἐν τῇ ἀγχιστείᾳ μὴ ὅντες εἶχον τι τῶν*

μὴ προσηκόντων, τοῦτ' ἀν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύτατα γένους ῥᾳδίως ἀφηρέθησαν. There seems to be no other explanation of μή with ὅντες than to make the sentence generic. It is true the MSS. have ὁπότε, instead of ὅτι, ὅτε, but this does not alter the construction. ὅτε or ὁπότε with the indicative in a generic sentence is not common, but it is found, as the following examples show: Dem., xx, 24: ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ποιοῦσιν—ib., xxii, 71: ὁπότε—μὴ προσγραψάμενος—φαίνεται, and these are sufficient to warrant the use of μή with the participle above.¹

οὐ is also occasionally found in these conditional relative sentences where we should expect μή to be used. Cf. Aeschylus, Agam., 13:

εὗτ' ἀν δὲ νυκτίπλαγκτον ἔνδροσόν τ' ἔχω
εὔνην ὀνείροις οὐκ ἐπισκοπουμένην.

Adhaerescence would suffice to explain *οὐ* here. Eurip. Sup., 425:

ὅταν πονηρὸς ἀξίωμ' ἀνὴρ ἔχῃ
γλώσση κατασχὼν δῆμον, οὐδὲν ἀν τὸ πρίν.

The participial clause is here separated from the principal sentence.

Plato, Theaet., 195 C: ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι. Adhaerescence again.

Generally we have ὅσοι, ὅσα μή, but occasionally *οὐ* is found as in Thuc., I, 7: ὅσοι ὅντες οὐ θαλάσσιοι κάτω φύκουν. Plato, Phaedo, 104 B; Aristoph., Plutus, 754–5.

ώς again shows its tendency to take *οὐ* in spite of the force of the principal sentence in Isoc, vi, 61: ὅταν ὄρῳμεν ἡμᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἐνηνοχότας τὰς συμφοράς, ώς οὐδενὲς ἄλλοι πώποτε —τοὺς δὲ μηδὲ τὰς εύτυχίας φέρειν δυναμένους.

7. *Elliptical Expressions—εἰ μή, ὅσον, ὅσα μή with the Participle.*

Closely connected with the last two classes are certain elliptical expressions with *εἰ μή* and *ὅσον* or *ὅσα μή*, in which the participle

¹ Cf. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 535; Krüger, § 67, 4, 2. Other examples are Plato, Phaedo, 84 E: ὅτε γε μηδὲ ὄμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν—Rep., I, 354 C: δπότε γάρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἴδα, and perhaps Lysias, xxvi, 10, although here the sentence seems to be more causal than generic, which would not take μή: νῦν δέ, ὅτε μὴ οὖν ιππευκώς μηδὲ βεβουλευκώς—φαίνεται.

is occasionally used. At first the principal verb was doubtless supplied from the context, and we had an ordinary conditional or generic relative sentence. But as time went on the ellipsis became less apparent, and *εἰ μή* and *ὅσον μή* became mere phrases with the meaning “except,” and were used to limit a previous assertion. And so we find them used, not only with the participle, but also with nouns and adjectives. This is the explanation usually adopted for this construction. For a different one see Madvig, Syntax, p. 206, who takes *μή* with the participle as a negative condition, the *εἰ* being added to strengthen the conditional force. The passages in which the participle is employed are as follows, Aeschylus, Agam., 1139 :

*ποῖ δή με δεῦρο τὴν τάλαιναν ἥγαγες ;
οὐδέν ποτ' εἰ μὴ ξυνθανουμένην.*

We could supply here *ἐμὲ δεῦρο ἥγαγες*, but it is not necessary. Eurip., Medea, 369 :

*δοκεῖς γὰρ ἀν με τόνδε θωπεῦσαι ποτε,
εἰ μή τι κερδαίνουσαν ἢ τεχνωμένην ;*

Also (Rhesus, 118); Aristoph., Clouds, 229; Fragment, 217; Thuc., v, 47, 5; VII, 38, 1; Xen., Cyr., II, 2, 11; Dem., xxiv, 46; Plato, Crito, 52 B, in which both *ὅτι μή* and *εἰ μή* are found, although the clause with *ὅτι μή* is bracketed by Wohlrap.

Hdt., III, 72, shows the original construction in which the verb had to be supplied : *φυλακὰς γὰρ δή διεστεώσας οἰδάς κού καὶ αὐτός, εἰ μὴ ἴδων, ἀλλ’ ἀκούσας.*

With *ὅσον* or *ὅσα μή* the sense is less clearly “except,” and the participle seems to have more of a conditional force. Cf. Soph., O. R., 348 :

*ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ
καὶ ξυμφυτεῦσαι τούργον εἰργάσθαι θ', ὅσον
μὴ χερσὶ καίνων.*

i. e., “as far as you were able to do it without killing him with your own hands.” Cf. Trach., 1214 :

ὅσον γ' ἀν αὐτὸς μὴ ποτιψαύων χεροῖν.

Lycurgus, § 94: *εἰς τούτους μὴ ὅτι ἀμαρτεῖν ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ εὐεργετοῦντας τὸν αὐτῶν βίον καταναλῶσαι μέγιστον ἀσέβημά ἔστιν.* For ὅσα μή, cf. Thuc., I, 111, 1: *τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προιόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων.* Ib., IV, 16, 1.

In the sense of “almost,” “all but,” ὅσον *οὐ* is used, and the union is so close that *οὐ* is retained even in a sentence that demands *μή*. Cf. Thuc., I, 36, 1: *ὅταν ἐσ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον—ἐνδοιάζῃ.*

8. *With the Infinitive.*

The infinitive regularly takes *μή* except after verbs of saying and thinking, and even after these when they have an asseverative force, as we shall see below. A participle depending on such an infinitive is also generally negated by *μή*. It is to this use of *μή* with the participle that we now direct our attention. Three subordinate classes that belong under this head have already been treated, i. e., the indirect imperative (p. 22) after such verbs as *παραινεῖν*, *κελεύειν*, the indirect optative after *εὔχεσθαι*, *βούλεσθαι* (p. 26), and finally after verbs of swearing (p. 27). We have now to consider the use of the participle in connection with a more general use of the infinitive. The most common form in which it appears is with expressions denoting necessity, *δεῖ*, *χρή*, *ἀνάγκη*, *ἀναγκαῖόν ἔστι*, *φημὶ δεῖν* (another indirect form of the imperative), and the verbals in *-téon*, *-téos*. Out of a total of two hundred and seventeen examples of *μή* with the participle in infinitive clauses, seventy-four belong to this class. The articular infinitive, the infinitive after *ώστε*, the infinitive as a substantival amplification of a pronominal idea, e. g., *τοῦτό ἔστι σοφόν*, *σώζειν τὸ σῶμα μὴ ἐκ τύχης ὡρμισμένον*, and various minor categories make up the rest.

Homer and the early lyric poets do not make any use of this construction. The first example is found in Theognis, 280: *εἰκὸς τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρα κακῶς τὰ δίκαια νομίζειν, μηδεμίαν κατόπιθ’ ἀξόμενον νέμεσιν*, where the participle is causal, but takes *μή* owing to the force of the infinitive.

Pindar has two possible instances, although they are both explained otherwise by some scholars. The first is Nemea, v,

14 : *αἰδέομαι μέγα εἰπεῖν ἐν δίκᾳ τε μή κεκινδυνευμένον.* Here Rumpel, Lex. Pind., ascribes *μή* to the force of the infinitive, and this seems to be a possible explanation. Bury, however, The Nemean Odes of Pindar, takes *μή* with *ἐν δίκᾳ* and makes it subjective—"peradventure not justly risked." The position of the negative is against this explanation, although Boeckh thinks it possible.

The other passage is Nemea, VIII, 4 : *ἀγαπατὰ δὲ καιροῦ μὴ πλαναθέντα ἔργον ἔκαστον τῶν ἀρειόνων ἐρώτων ἐπικρατεῖν δύνασθαι.* Here Rumpel explains *μή* as being due to the conditional force of the participle. It seems to me, however, that the conditional force is very faint and that the participle is simply descriptive = "without wandering." In this event *μή* depends on the infinitive.

It may be well to notice here that these two classes, conditional and infinitive, continually cross each other, and it is often hard to tell which exerts the greater influence. Take for instance an example like Eurip., Hecuba, 743 :

*οὔτοι πέφυκα μάντις, ὥστε μὴ κλύων
ἔξιστορῆσαι σῶν ὁδὸν βουλευμάτων.*

Here, by comparison with Dem., III, 21, and Isaeus, XII, 3, where the same construction occurs, I prefer to class the participle as conditional, but in all of them *μή* might depend on the force of the infinitive. One is obliged to follow his own feeling in such cases, and no two persons would be likely to make exactly the same classification.

These passages, as well as those from Pindar, show the difficulties we encounter under this head. Other doubtful passages are : Eurip., Medea, 813 :

*σοὶ δὲ συγγνώμη λέγειν
τάδ' ἐστί, μὴ πάσχουσαν ώς ἐγὼ κακῶς.*

There seems to be no other explanation of *μή* here than to make it depend on the infinitive.¹

Thuc., II, 83, 5 : *ἔταξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ώς μέγιστον οἷοί τ' ἦσαν* (sc. *ποιῆσαι*) *μὴ διδόντες διέκπλουν*—ib., III, 16, 1 :

¹ Cf. Jebb to Soph. Ajax, 1007. Aken, p. 228, would prefer *οὐ*.

δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ἐγνώκασιν, ἀλλ' οἰοί τέ εἰσι μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελ. ἐπιὸν ῥᾳδίως ἀμύνεσθαι—ib., VIII, 44, 1: ἡγούμενοι—δυνατοὶ ἔσεσθαι Τισσαφέρην μὴ αἴτοῦντες χρήματα, τρέφειν τὰς ναῦς.

I believe that in all of these cases *μή* is due to the fact that the participles form part of the infinitive clause. It is true that in the first case the participle could be explained as conditional, but scarcely in the others. Cf. Dem., IV, 15, and Isoc., VIII, 12, which are thus explained by Rehdantz.

Notice also Lysias, XXIV, 18: *τοῖς μὲν ἵσχυροῖς ἐγχωρεῖ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς πάσχοντι*—*ὑβρίζειν*, where the participle, though attracted into the case of the subject, really belongs to the infinitive. Similar examples are Isoc., III, 64; XV, 225, 289.

In Plato, Rep., III, 389 C, the participle seems to be used instead of the infinitive: *πρὸς—τοὺς τοιούτους ἀρχοντας ἰδιώτῃ ψεύσασθαι ταῦτὸν καὶ μεῖζον ἀμάρτημα φήσομεν ή κάμνοντι πρὸς ἴατρὸν ή ἀσκοῦντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην—μὴ τάληθῆ λέγειν, ή πρὸς κυβερνήτην—μὴ τὰ δύντα λέγοντι*. This participle could be explained as conditional, but from the preceding part of the sentence we should expect the infinitive to be used here also. Plato seems to have substituted the participle instead. Cf. Laws, VI, 773 E, where a similar construction is thus explained by Stallbaum.

Notice finally Laws, IV, 717 D, E: *τελευτησάντων δὲ γονέων ταφή μὲν ή σωφρονεστάτη καλλίστη, μήθ' ὑπεραίροντα τῶν εἴθισμένων δύκων μήτ' ἐλεείποντα*. The participles depend on the verbal idea in *ταφή—καλλίστη* which equals *θάπτειν κάλλιστόν ἔστι*. Cf. Stallbaum.

The full list of passages in which the participle with *μή* forming part of an infinitive clause occurs, is as follows:

Theognis: 280.	Sophocles: Ajax, 1007. O. R., 1110.	Iph. Tau., 1288. Medea, 239, 815. (Rhesus, 590.) Frag., 950.
Pindar: Nemea, v, 14, VIII, 4.	Euripides: Hel., 814. H. F., 203, 285. Hipp., 249.	Tragici Min.: Incert., 324, 546.
Aeschylus: Sup., 409. Eumen., 301.		

Aristophanes :	Hell., IV, 1, 35. v, 2, 38. VI, 1, 12. Oec., VI, 7. xii, 19. Conv., v, 4. Hiero, II, 8.	Isaeus :
Achar., 354. Knights, 905. Clouds, 268. Eccl., 788. Plutus, 552, 802.	Rep. Lac., VIII, 2. Cyn., IV, 1. VI, 25.	III, 51. VI, 12. IX, 11. XI, 21.
Comici Min. :		Demosthenes :
Archippus, 43. Antiph., 187, 5. Xenarchus, 4, 10. Menander, 252, 532, 11, 543, 4.	Antiphon :	I, 6. IV, 15. (VII, 6.) VIII, 76. IX, 67. (X, 45.) (XIII, 3.) XIV, 33. XV, 28. XVIII, 58, 100, 125, 159. XIX, 64, 114, 218, 237. XX, 72, 90. XXI, 61, 67. XXII, 56, 57. XXIII, 122. XXIV, 65, 69, 77. XXVII, 55. XXX, 29. XXXI, 14. (XXXIV, 52.) XXXVI, 12. (XLVI, 5.) (XLVII, 56.) LVII, 24. LVIII, 1, 22, 25, 41, 47.
Herodotus :	Lysias :	Proem., 34, 3, 56, 1. Epis., II, 1.
v, 18. VI, 7. VII, 24. IX, 41.	III, 25. IV, 4. XII, 69. XIX, 33, 51. XXIV, 18. XXXII, 19.	Aeschines :
Thucydides :	Isocrates :	I, 126. III, 68.
I, 72, 1, 74, 3, 86, 3, 120, 2. II, 43, 1, 65, 8, 83, 5. III, 16, 1, 39, 5, 42, 5, 59, 1. IV, 78, 2, 118, 4. VI, 36, 3, 70, 1, 84, 1, VII, 44, 5. VIII, 44, 1, 68, 4.	III, 16, 58, 64. VI, 89 (bis). 105. VIII, 12. IX, 39. X, 15. XII, 123, 147, 181. XIV, 8. 55 (bis). XV, 225, 265, 289. XVI, 9. XIX, 48. XXI, 15. Epis., II, 3.	
Xenophon :		
Cyr., II, 4, 32. VIII, 8, 11. Mem., II, 8, 1, 10, 3. III, 9, 14. 14, 6. IV, 1, 1.		

Lycurgus:	480 C,	644 E.
§ 28.	494 A,	IV, 717 D, E.
	501 D,	V, 730 A,
	513 D,	732 B,
Plato:	Rep., I, 334 C,	D,
Apol., 28 D,	341 A.	739 A.
29 A,	II, 380 C,	VI, 773 E,
32 C.	383 A.	777 E.
Phaedo, 78 A.	III, 389 C,	VII, 793 C.
Crat., 432 E.	394 D,	802 B,
Theaet., 160 A,	416 D.	806 A,
172 A,	IV, 443 D.	816 E.
188 A.	V, 474 C.	VIII, 829 B,
Soph., 229 C.	VI, 488 B,	831 D,
Polit., 286 C,	D. E.	838 E,
295 D.	VII, 520 B,	857 B.
Sym., 204 A.	539 D.	IX, 873 D,
Phaedrus, 242 E.	VIII, 548 D,	877 A.
Alcib., I, 117 D.	552 A,	X, 890 A.
Laches, 201 A.	554 A.	XII, 942 A,
Lysis, 210 E.	Tim., 32 A.	958 E,
Gorgias, 456 E,	(Minos, 321 D.)	965 A.
459 C,	Laws, I, 640 B,	Epinomis, 983 C.

When *οὐ* is found instead of *μή* in this construction, the cause is usually apparent. It is either adhaerent, as in Eurip., Frag., 578 :

ὦστε' οὐ παρόντα ποντίας ὑπὲρ πλακὸς
τάκει κατ' οἴκους πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς.

Cf. Thuc., II, 65, 8 ; VIII, 68, 4 ; Isocr., VIII, 25 ; Xen., Cyr., II, 1, 16. Or a verb of saying or thinking precedes and throws the image of *oratio obliqua* over the whole sentence, so that we have *ὦστε—οὐ* with the participle. Examples are Hdt., I, 189 ; Plato, Gorgias, 458 E.¹

In Xen., Oec., VIII, 21 : *ἔξεστι καὶ πεῖραν λαμβάνειν αὐτῶν οὔτε τι ζημιαθέντας οὔτε τι πολλὰ πονήσαντας*, the negatives must be taken with the principal verb ; otherwise we should have *μή*. Cf. De Re. Eq., IX, 5 : *οὐ δεῖ ἔξαπιναίως σπᾶν ἀλλ' ἡρεμαίως προσάγεσθαι τῷ χαλίνῳ, πραῦνοντα, οὐ βιαζόμενον ἡρεμεῖν.*

Dem., XV, 25 : *ἄτοπόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν δικαίων ὑμᾶς διδάσκειν αὐτὸν οὐ τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντα.* The fact is emphasized, hence *οὐ* is retained.

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., VII, 174.

In xix, 218, the negative changes from $\mu\acute{\eta}$ to $o\grave{u}$ after $\tilde{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$. The sentence is long and the principal verb at the end in the indicative. Perhaps Demosthenes started it with the intention of using the infinitive, but changed to the indicative before he finished it. Hence the change in the negatives.

9. *Supplementary Participle with μή.*

The participle frequently takes the place of an accusative with the infinitive after verbs of sense action. The negative of this participle is generally $o\grave{u}$ when the force of the oratio obliqua is strongly felt, except, as we have already seen, when the principal verb is an imperative or expresses a condition (cf. p. 20). But even when this is not the case we frequently find $\mu\acute{\eta}$ both with the infinitive and the participle after $o\tilde{\iota}\delta\alpha$, $\nu oμί\zeta\omega$, and other similar verbs. The cause of this change must lie in the force of the verb itself. The explanation usually advanced is as follows: The verb of knowing or thinking is no longer felt as such, but becomes to all intents and purposes a verb of *will*, and hence takes $\mu\acute{\eta}$ after the analogy of such verbs as $\tilde{\delta}μνυμι$, $\pi iστεύω$, and the like.¹

The first example of this construction is found in Soph., O. C., 656:

$ο\tilde{\iota}\delta'$ $\acute{e}γ\acute{w}$ σe $\mu\acute{\eta}$ $\tau i\omega$
 $\acute{e}nθēnδ'$ $\acute{a}πάξou\tau'$ $\acute{a}nδra$ $\pi rōs$ $\beta i\omega$ $\acute{e}mo\bar{u}$.

Similar examples are found in vv. 797, 1121; Phil., 79; Thuc., I, 76, 1; II, 17, 2; V, 60, 5; VI, 18, 7; VII, 8, 2; Xen., Cyr., VII, 2, 22; Aeschines, II, 126. Thuc., VII, 8, 2, is the least clear of these examples, but even there $\nu oμί\zeta\omega n$ seems to have the force of $\acute{e}λπi\zeta\omega n$: $\acute{e}γrαψe\acute{v}$ $\acute{e}piσtōlēn$, $\nu oμί\zeta\omega n$ $o\tilde{\iota}t\omega s$ $\acute{a}n$ $\mu a\acute{l}i\omega t\omega t\omega \tau\acute{a}n$ $a\acute{n}t\omega u$ $\gamma n\acute{a}m\omega n$ $\mu\acute{η}d\acute{e}n$ $\acute{e}n$ $\tau\acute{a}w$ $\acute{a}γg\acute{e}l\omega$ $\acute{a}f\acute{a}n\iota\sigma\theta\acute{e}n\sigma a$ $\mu a\acute{b}\acute{o}n\tau\omega s$ $t\omega u\acute{s}$ 'Αθηnaίouς $\beta o\acute{u}l\omega\acute{e}n\sigma a\sigma\theta\acute{h}ai$ $\pi e\acute{r}i$ $t\omega s$ $\acute{a}l\eta\theta\acute{e}i\acute{a}s$.

Not only after these verbs of knowing and thinking, where asseverative force is easily postulated, do we find this construction used, but also after verbs of showing, $\delta e\acute{i}knu\mu i$, $\acute{a}πoφai\acute{n}ω$, etc.,

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., I, 48; XIII, 259; Humphreys to Soph., Antigone, 1064.

where such an explanation is more difficult. Cf. Eurip., *Tro.*, 970 :

καὶ τὴνδε δείξω μὴ λέγονταν ἔνδικα.

Similar examples are Xen., *Ages.*, I, 12; Isoc., XII, 58 (*εὗροι τις ἄν*); XV, 144 (*οὐ* followed by *μή*); Dem., XIX, 212 (*ῶστε* c. inf. precedes); XXVII, 47 (*πῶς ἀν τις ἐπιδείξειε*, where the question might account for *μή*); Plato, *Euthyd.*, 286 A. Perhaps the same explanation suffices here as above, but it is rather more difficult to feel it. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 685 and 688, explains the irregularity in the use of *μή* in the former class, as well as in the latter, by saying that “the fixed earlier use of *μή* in other constructions of the infinitive affected the later constructions of indirect discourse.” This, however, does not explain why the construction is only sporadic and not universal. It seems better, therefore, to resort to the explanation adopted above.

10. *Μή with the Participle in Interrogative Sentences.*

As the last class of the first division of our subject we have to treat *μή* with the participle in the interrogative sentence. *Μή* is the regular negative in direct questions when the answer expected is negative or when the question is put in a dubitative form, either with the subjunctive, which is the interrogative form of the prohibition, (cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 79 A), or with the optative and *ἄν*, which implies prevention.¹ The indirect question takes *μή* if this negative would have been used in the direct form, and also in the second member of the disjunctive question with *εἰ—ἢ* or *εἴτε—εἴτε*, where, however, *οὐ* is also found.

In most of these classes we find *μή* with the participle used, not as a substitute for the principal verb, but as forming a subordinate part of the interrogative sentence.

Of the direct questions that expect or anticipate a negative answer, but a single example has been noted in which *μή* with the participle appears, i. e., Plato, *Sophistes*, 267 C: *Μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὅντες*;

¹ Cf. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 291, 292.

The direct dubitative question is somewhat better represented. Examples are, Aeschylus, Agam., 786 :

πῶς σε προσείπω ; πῶς σε σεβίζω
μήθ' ὑπεράρας μήθ' ὑποκάμψας
καιρὸν χάριτος ;

Dem., xix, 320 ; xx, 60 ; Plato, Phaedo, 79 A ; Sophistes, 218 E. Possibly we may also include here sentences like Plato, Philebus, 43 A : λέγονται γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν. πῶς γὰρ ἀν μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες ; which commentators usually explain by the Latin translation “quippe cum or qui.” Cf. also Alcib., II, 141 C ; Laws, 639 C. and D.

If the dubitative question is put in an indirect form, *μή* is of course retained. Examples are Theognis, 913 :

φροντίζω τούτων ἦν τιν' ἵω προτέρην,
ἢ μηδὲν δαπανῶν τρύχω βίον ἐν κακότητι, κτέ.

Aristoph., Peace, 21 :

τίς—έμοὶ κατειπάτω
πόθεν ἀν πριαίμην βῆνα μὴ τετρημένην.

Cf. Xen., Cyr., iv, 3, 4; Hell., v, 4, 29; Isaeus, IV, 14 : σκεπτέον δὴ ὑμῖν πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐποιήσατο τὰς διαθήκας, ἔπειτα εἰ μὴ παρανοῶν διέθετο. Plato, Apol., 22 E : ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν—πότερα δεξαίμην ἀν οὗτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν μήτε τι σοφὸς ἀν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν.

Cf. also Char., 167 D; 168 A; Rep., III, 412 E; VI, 504 E.

As has been said already, the disjunctive question may take *μή* as well as *οὐ* in its second member. The participle is also occasionally found in this position and is of course also negatived by *μή*. Examples occur chiefly in prose, but there is one in Aeschylus, Agam., 261 :

σὺ δ' εἴ τι κεδνόν, εἴτε μὴ πεπυσμένη,
εὐαγγέλουσιν ἐλπίσιν θυηπολεῖς
κλύοιμ' ἀν εὔφρων.

In prose we have Xen., Mem., I, 2, 45 : ὅσα τις μὴ πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινὰ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων εἴτε μή(γράφων). Lysias, IV, 15,

is similar. Isaeus, VII, 12: εἴτ' οὖν Εὔπολις γεγένηται αἴτιος (μὴ) δοῦναι (βουληθείς), εἴτ' Ἀπολλόδωρος λαβεῖν μὴ ἐθελήσας, τὰς ἔχθρας, ὅτι διέμειναν τὸ ἔργον δεδήλωκε. μή-βουληθείς in the first member of the sentence is due to the correction of the editors. The MSS. have simply δοῦναι.

Plato, Sophistes, 222 B: θὲς δὲ ὅπῃ χαίρεις εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἡμερον εἴτε ἀνθρώπων μηδεμίαν ἥγει θήραν.

Other examples are Char., 171 C; Laches, 184 B; 189 A; Laws, IX, 856 B; XII, 962 E.

The following table sums up in a brief compass the results of the preceding pages in which the use of *μή* with the participle depending on the principal verb of the sentence has been treated.

AUTHORS.	Imperative.	Optative.	Oath.	Final Clauses.	Conditional with εἰ.	Generic Relative.	Elliptical Expressions εἰ μή, &c.	Infinitive.	Supplementary.	Interrogative.	Total.
Homer.....	1	1	2
Hesiod.....	2	3	5
Lyric Poets, not including Pindar.....	7	2	1	2	1	1	1	13
Pindar.....	1	1	1	2	2	2	5
Aeschylus.....	5	1	1	1	2	2	2	12
Sophocles.....	8	1	3	3	4	2	2	4	4	27
Euripides.....	22	9	1	7	11	2	9	1	62
Tragici Min.....	1	1	2	4
Aristophanes.....	2	3	1	4	2	2	6	1	1	21
Comici Min.....	4	1	2	2	2	3	3	12
Herodotus.....	5	2	8	2	4	21
Thucydides.....	16	2	1	10	5	4	20	4	62
Xenophon.....	11	2	5	30	19	1	17	2	3	90
Orators.....	14	7	1	13	130	31	2	85	5	5	293
Plato.....	40	2	5	75	49	1	64	1	16	253
Total.....	138	34	4	30	270	129	15	217	17	28	882

From this summary we see that the use of *μή* with the participle in clauses that demand that negative is very rare in Epic poetry, and not much more frequent in Lyric. It begins to be common in the dramatists and reaches its highest development, both in respect to frequency of occurrence and variety of constructions, in

the orators and Plato. In many of the passages cited the participle could not possibly be resolved into a finite verb similar to the principal one and hence we must conclude, contrary to Aken's view, that the principal verb does frequently exert a sufficient influence on an adjacent participle to cause $\mu\bar{\eta}$ to be used when, strictly speaking, it ought to be negated by $o\bar{v}$.

II.

THE INDEPENDENT PARTICIPLE WITH $\mu\bar{\eta}$.

We turn now to the second main division of our subject. We have seen in the preceding pages what influence the principal verb exerts over a participle that forms an integral part of the thought ; we have now to consider what effect the predication that the participle itself implies has on the choice of the negative. According to the principle already laid down in the introduction, when the participle can be resolved into a declarative sentence it takes as its negative $o\bar{v}$, but when, on the other hand, it represents a conditional proposition it must have $\mu\bar{\eta}$. This is the element that lies at the basis of the independent use of the participle with $\mu\bar{\eta}$.

The participle may appear in a variety of forms : It may represent the protasis of a condition, the apodosis of which is either expressed or understood ; it may take the form of a concessive sentence ; it may appear as a generic sentence, with or without the article, but in all these uses it is the conditional element that requires $\mu\bar{\eta}$ rather than $o\bar{v}$.

The two main classes into which these participles fall are : first, those in which the conditional force is actually expressed in the form of a condition, the participle representing the protasis ; and secondly, those in which the conditional force appears in the generic use of the participle, generally with the article, but sometimes without. Let us take them up in this order.

1. *The Conditional Participle with $\mu\bar{\eta}$.*

The Greeks were not very fond of the conditional participle. It was too shadowy, too inexact for them. Hence their avoidance

of it in laws and decrees. In classical Greek we have noted about six hundred examples of the conditional participle with which the negative *μή* is employed. But even when thus negatived the conditional force is sometimes hard to distinguish, and this difficulty is increased when, as we have already seen in connection with the infinitive, the *μή* might be due to some other cause. The cases that are absolutely certain are those in which the participle is used in antithesis to, or parallel to, *εἰ* with the finite verb, *μέν* and *δέ* being frequently employed to bring out the antithesis more clearly. To this class of the conditional participle we first direct our attention. The number of them is not large, and the construction belongs chiefly to prose. To take an extreme case first, notice how two different authors, speaking about the same subject and using almost exactly the same words, employ, the one, the participle, the other, the finite verb. In Aeschylus, Septem, 427 f., Capaneus says :

*θεοῦ τε γὰρ θέλοντος ἐκπέρσειν πόλιν
καὶ μὴ θέλοντος.*

while Euripides, in the Supplices, 499 f., makes him say :

*ῶμοσεν πόλιν
πέρσειν θεοῦ θέλοντος, ἦν τε μὴ θέλη.*

Note again Soph., O. R., 1158 :

ΟΙ. ἀλλ' εἰς τόδ' ἥξεις μὴ λέγων γε τοῦνδικον.
ΘΕ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον, ἦν φράσω, διόλλυμαι.

In Euripides, Andromache, 382, the contrast is heightened by the use of *δέ*:

*ώς ἦν θάνης σύ, παῖς ὅδ' ἐκφεύγει μόρον,
σοῦ δ' οὐ θελούσης κατθανεῖν, τόνδε κτενῶ.*

οὐ is due to adhærescence.

In Thuc., v, 46, 2, the Athenians bid their ambassadors say to the Spartans : *τὴν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνεῖναι, ἦν μὴ ἐσ τὰς σπονδὰς ἐσίωσι*, while in § 4 the ambassadors say : *εἰ μὴ τὴν*

ξυμμαχίαν ἀνήσουσι Βοιωτοῖς μὴ ἐσιοῦσιν ἐσ τὰς σπουδάς κτέ. Here *μή* with the participle is but a repetition of the preceding condition. Other examples in which this parallelism exists are Plato, Sophistes, 263 C; Par., 139 C; 145 D (bis); 165 E; Philebus, 42 E.

Examples in which the two clauses are antithetical are, in addition to those quoted above, Hdt., I, 187; Xen., Mem., III, 6, 14; Cyr., V, 2, 32; VIII, 1, 12; Antiphon, II, γ, 8; Isaeus, IV, 5; Dem., XVI, 30; XXIII, 110; XXVII, 20; Plato, Meno, 98 E; Rep., I, 337 E; V, 459 C; Laws, VI, 783 E; VII, 820 D; 822 C; XI, 930 B; Philemon, Frag, 213 (with *μὴ oὐ*). These examples show better than any others how nearly the Greeks had come to regard the participle as a substitute for the finite verb.

We turn now to those conditional participles which stand by themselves and do not have this antithetical or parallel clause to render certain the conditional force. We are thus left to the general context to decide as to the nature of the participle. Sometimes the decision is by no means easy, as the conditional force is frequently not very strong, especially when the apodosis is not expressed.

This class forms one of the largest divisions of our subject, being only surpassed by the generic participle with the article. With the exception of Epic poetry, it is found in all spheres of literature, and abounds most in the orators and Plato, who, as I have no doubt statistics would prove, make more frequent use of the conditional proposition than any other writers.

We give at once a table showing the use of the construction by the different authors, as the class is too numerous to permit us to cite all the passages in which it occurs :

Homer.....	1	Tragici Minores.....	4
Hesiod.....	...	Aristophanes.....	8
Lyric Poets, not including Pindar.....	2	Comici Minores.....	6
Pindar.....	...	Herodotus.....	30
Aeschylus.....	11	Thucydides.....	42
Sophocles.....	11	Xenophon.....	52
Euripides.....	30	Orators.....	161
		Plato	202
Total.....			560

We notice that Epic poetry is represented by but a single example, and even this is not a good one, as the negative goes more closely with the following noun. The passage is Iliad, xiii, 47 f.:

Αἴαντε σφώ μέν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀλκῆς μνησαμένω, μηδὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο.

This avoidance of *μή* with the conditional participle in Epic poetry is certainly not due to a lack of opportunity to use it. Doubtless it is caused by the adjectival nature of the participle itself, to which reference has already been made, and which does not permit the use of *μή*, and to Homer's reluctance to combine the negative *μή* with anything else but the verb.

The orators vary much in this use of the participle—Demosthenes having seventy-four examples, while Lycurgus, Deinarchus and Hypereides (in the single speech examined) do not use it at all. In the dialogues of Plato, also, we see the same variation. The Parmenides, for instance, has twenty-seven examples, while the Phaedrus, a slightly longer dialogue, has but one, and the Gorgias, a much longer dialogue, but three.

Some subordinate classifications, and some few passages that need explanation, will now be mentioned.

We sometimes find *μή* with the participle equivalent to a conditional wish = “provided that not, if only not,” Latin *dum ne* with the subjunctive. Examples are, Aeschylus, Eumen., 693 :

ἐν δὲ τῷ σέβας
ἀστῶν φόβος τε συγγενῆς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
σχήσει τό τ' ἡμαρ καὶ κατ' εὐφρόνην ὄμως,
αὐτῶν πολιτῶν μὴ πικαινούντων νόμους.

γε is sometimes added to strengthen this force, as in Euripides, Alcestis, 1106 :

χρή, σοῦ γε μὴ μέλλοντος ὥργαίνειν ἐμοί.

Other examples are Euripides, Helena, 1050, 1052; Heraclidae, 264; Trag. Min., Frag. Incert., 166; (Menander, Mon., 563); Thuc., v, 41, 2; Xen., Anab., i, 9, 13; Plato, Theaet., 160 D;

Rep., v, 465 B; ix, 586 E; Laws, viii, 824 B, 844 A; x, 895 B.

In Soph., O. R., 289, there is a construction, an exact parallel to which has not been noted. It is the oft cited passage:

πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.

μὴ παρών = εἰ μὴ πάρεστι, and this full expression is not infrequently found. Cf. Thuc., iv, 85, 2: *θαυμάζω—εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφῆγματι*.

We may, however, include in this same category of *μή* with the participle after verbs of emotion those cases in which the participle is used after *αισχύνομαι*, and is equivalent to the protasis of a condition. Cf. Xen., Cyr., III, 2, 16: *αισχυνοίμεθ' ἂν σοι μὴ ἀποδιδόντες*. See Hertlein's note. Other examples are Cyr., viii, 2, 13; Hell., vi, 5, 44; Lysias, xxv, 34; Plato, Protag., 312 A; Sym., 218 D; Hip., Maior, 298 B.

In Soph., O. R., 1368, we have another rare use of the participle:

κρείσσων γὰρ ἥσθα μηκέτ' ὁν ἢ ζῶν τυφλός.

The peculiarity here lies in the use of the personal instead of the impersonal construction. It really stands for *κρείσσον ἥν σε μηκέτ' εἶναι*, but the participle may be explained as conditional. Only two other examples have been noted in classical Greek. These are Lysias, xxvi, 4; Aeschines, I, 192.¹

The equivalence of cause and condition, as expressed by the participle, was one of the most direct lines by which later writers arrived at the use of *μή* with the purely causal participle. It may be well, therefore, to cite some examples of this construction to show how easily they could be led astray. Cf., for instance, Aristoph., Clouds, 792:

ἀπὸ γὰρ ὀλοῦμαι μὴ μαθὼν χλωττοστροφεῖν.

= “For want of learning.” Cf. Humphreys’ note. Hdt., III, 65: *οὗτος μὲν τετελεύτεκε—τούτου δὲ μηκέτι ἔόντος—γίγνεται μοι ἀναγκαιότατον κτέ.* = “since he is no longer living,” but this is

¹ For examples in late Greek, cf. Lobeck to Soph., Ajax, 634.

put in a conditional form. Cf. Plato, Sym., 180 C : εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶς ήν ὁ Ἐρως καλῶς ἀν εἰχε. νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εἰς. μὴ δύντος δὲ ἐνὸς ὄρθοτερόν ἐστι κτέ. Xen., Mem., I, 6, 12 : δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἀν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξαπατᾶς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενός γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος. Notice that in this case the participle is parallel with a clause with ὅτι. Antiphon, II, β, 4 : ἄθλια μὲν οὖν πάσχω μὴ ἀπολογεῖσθαι μόνον βιαζόμενος. Lysias, xix, 29 : πρότερον μὴ ὑπαρχούσης οὐσίας (here the causal force seems to predominate). Isoc., xviii, 52 : δικάζειν μὲν οὐκ ἡξίου—ἄλλως τε καὶ μὴ παρόντος τούτου μηδὲ μέλλοντος ποιήσειν κτέ. Isaeus, III, 72 : ἀλλ' οὕτε ἐγένετο οὕτ' ἔστι, μὴ γενομένων δὴ παίδων γνησίων ἐκείνῳ, ἐγγυτέρῳ ἡμῶν οὐδὲ εἰς—ib., v, 16 : ἀμφοῖν δὲ ταῦν διαθήκαιν ἀκύροιν γιγνομέναιν, καὶ ἐτέρας μηδεμιᾶς δύμολογουμένης εἶναι, κατὰ δόσιν μὲν οὐδενὶ προσῆκε τοῦ κλήρου.¹ Cf. further Dem. (xiii, 36); xxxvi, 6; xxxix, 35.

We see, then, from passages like these and some few others to be mentioned later, in which *μή* seems to be used with the purely causal participle, how easily men whose sensibilities for the delicate shades of the language had been dulled to some extent, and who were always striving for that which was more forcible and expressive, could be led to feel that *μή* was the proper negative of the causal participle.

The following are a few rather difficult passages in which the conditional force of the participle is not very manifest, but which, I think, may be classed under this head.

The first is Soph., Philoctetes, 1161 :

τίς ὡδ' ἐν αὔραις τρέφεται
μηκέτι μηδενὸς κρατύνων ὅσα πέμπει βιόδωρος αἰα;

The participle is generic, says Jebb, with his usual explanation when in a difficulty. Aken, p. 229, prefers *οὐ*. I believe, however, that while the participle is largely temporal, there is sufficient conditional force implied to cause *μή* to be used.

¹ For another explanation of *μή* here, see Spieker, A. J. P., vi, 323, who says that the participle has no conditional force and that “*μή* follows δύμολογουμένης grammatically as the regular negative after that verb.” But the similarity of this passage with the others cited leads me to believe that it may be explained in the same way as they.

Hdt. vi, 130 : *πᾶσι ὑμῖν, εἰ οἶόν τε εἴη, χαριζοίμην ἂν, μήτ’ ἔνα
ὑμέων ἔξαιρετον ἀποκρίνων μήτε τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀποδοκιμάζων.* Here we apparently have *μή* with the participle in the apodosis ; but the participle really contains a separate condition. Hence *μή*. For a similar example cf. Xen., Cyr., vii, 5, 86.

Thuc., i, 90, 1 : *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἡλθον
πρεσβείᾳ, τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἀν δρῶντες μήτ’ ἐκείνους μήτ’
ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα.* — *μή* is doubtless due to the conditional force of *ἔχοντα*. But the sentence is really a wish and this would also demand *μή*. Cf. Plato, Sym., 216 C : *ἡδέως ἀν ἴδοιμι
αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, where *μή* can also be explained as depending on the conditional force of *ὄντα*.

With Xen., Hipp., i, 18 : *τὸ μὲν πυκνὰ ἔξαγειν μὴ πολέμου
ὄντος ἵσως ὀχληρόν*, compare Dem., i, 27 ; Xen., Apol. Soc., § 24.

Plato, Laws, iv, 718 D : *τὰ τοίνυν δὴ λεχθέντα ἔδοξε τί μοι
προύργον δρᾶν εἰς τὸ περὶ ὧν ἀν παραυῆ μὴ παντάπασιν ὡμῆς
ψυχῆς λαβόμενα, μᾶλλον δ’ ἡμερώτερόν τε ἀν ἀκούειν καὶ εὐμενέ-
στερον.* Stallbaum explains *μή*—*λαβόμενα* as conditional. But we seem to need an infinitive rather than a participle and unless something has been dropped from the text, I should assume that the participle here takes the place of the infinitive ; cf. Rep., iii, 389 C ; Laws, vi, 773 E ; Thuc., vi, 1, 2 (MSS. reading), where such a substitution seems to have taken place.

There still remain to be noticed a few passages in which *οὐ* appears to be used contrary to the general rule. The first is Hdt., vii, 172 : *βοηθέειν δὲ οὐ βουλόμενοι ἀναγκαίην ἡμῖν οὐδεμίαν οἷοι
τέ ἔστε προσφέρειν.* Here Stein, who seems to think that Herodotus is careless in his use of the negatives, says, “*οὐ βουλόμενοι
ist wohl nur ein versehen für μὴ βουλόμενοι.*” It is much better, however, to explain a negative, if possible, than to accuse an author of making a mistake. This may possibly be an instance of adhaerescence, which, it is true, is rare with *βούλομαι*, but which the analogy of *οὐκ ἔθέλω* might easily induce, or Herodotus' rather frequent use of *οὐ* in the protasis may have produced *οὐ* here. Cf. i, 212, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ ποιήσεις*—vi, 9, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ ποι-
ήσουσι*—vii, 10 θ, *εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑποδύνειν οὐκ ἔθελήσεις*—
vii, 16, *εἰ δέ—οὐκ οἴλα τε αὐτὸ παρατρέψαι*.

Plato, *Apol.*, 20 C, is another example of *οὐ* in what seems to be a condition: *οὐ γὰρ δῆπου, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φύμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν.* Here the participle seems to be conditional, but it really states a fact, and hence *οὐ* not *μή* is used. So Aken, “nicht ‘wenn’ aber ‘weil.’”

Phaedo, 63 B: *εἰ ὡμην μὴ θέξειν παρ' ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους ἥδικουν ἀν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ.* Again the participle seems to have a conditional force, but Socrates wishes to emphasize the fact that he is not displeased with the idea of death. So Heindorf, “*ego qui non indignor aut quod non indignor.*”

Theaet., 193 B: *οὐδέποτ' ἐγώ—τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω—οὔτε γιγνώσκων, οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἀμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δὲ οὐ γιγνώσκων.* Here *οὐ* *γιγνώσκων* is conditional, as are also the other participles. *οὐ* can be explained by adhaerescence corresponding to *ἀγνοῶν* preceding, or as due to the influence of the other negatives which simply continue the preceding *οὐδέποτε*.

Rep., VII, 518 C: *φασὶ δέ πον οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι.* Here the use of *οὐ* rather than *μή* shows the impudence of these so-called professors, who deny that the soul has any knowledge until it has been instructed by them.

2. Concessive Participle with *μή*.

After the pure conditional participle we take up the concessive participle. Our justification for placing it here is that it most frequently appears in the form *καὶ μή* with the participle, which is virtually conditional. We must distinguish at the outset the concessive from the adversative participle. Theoretically this is very easy to do, for the adversative states an opposing fact, and hence has the negative *οὐ*, while the concessive grants an opposing notion, and hence has the negative *μή*.¹ Practically, however, it is often very hard to distinguish them, especially when *μή* may be due to the influence of the principal sentence. Take for example *Xen.*, *Mem.*, IV, 1, 1: *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι μὴ παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὠφέλει.* Here the participle is undoubtedly adversative,

¹ Gildersleeve, *Justin Martyr*, I, 7, 7.

and *μή* depends on the infinitive clause to which the participle belongs. So Soph., O. R., 1110 :

εἰ χρή τι κάμε μὴ συναλλάξαντά πω,
πρέσβεις, σταθμᾶσθαι, τὸν βοτῆρ' ὄρāν δοκῶ.

Again the participle is adversative, and *μή* depends on the infinitive. Ellendt says “*καίπερ μή*,” but *καίπερ* is always construed with *οὐ* in classical Greek.

Isoc. (I, 24): *ἔὰν μὴ δεόμενος τὸ δεῖσθαι προσποιῆ*. Here the participle might be regarded as concessive, since it is a mere assumed case, but *μή* might just as well depend on the condition.

These and similar instances we have classified under the head to which their principal verbs belong. We take up here only those participles that seem to be more truly concessive.

Another class which all the grammarians place under the head of the concessive participle is illustrated by Eurip., Frag., 440 :

γυναικὶ πείθου μηδὲ τάληθῇ κλύων.

and by Aristophanes, Acharnians, 222 :

*μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνοι ποτὲ
μηδέ περ γέροντας δύτας ἐκφυγῶν Ἀχαρνέας.*

where, however, strictly speaking, the participle is not negated, and *μή* really depends on the preceding verb. For other examples, cf. Soph., Ajax, 1010 f.; Eurip., Alcestis, 367 (parodied by Aristoph., Achar., 895); Antiphon, v, 16; Dem., xix, 42.

A particle is frequently used to bring out the adversative or concessive force of the clause more clearly. Those generally employed are *καίπερ*, *καὶ ταῦτα* and *καὶ*. Of these, *καίπερ* is always construed with *οὐ* (as has been said above), and hence the participle connected with it must be adversative. *καὶ ταῦτα* is also generally found with *οὐ*, but sometimes *μή* is used. Cf. Aristoph., Plutus, 802 :

*ώς ἡδὺ πράττειν, ὀνδρες, ἔστ' εὐδαιμόνως
καὶ ταῦτα μηδὲν ἔξενεγκόντ' οἴκοθεν.*

Isaeus, x, 23 : *εἰ μηδὲ τὸν τῆς μητρὸς κλῆρον λήψομαι, καὶ ταῦτα μηδὲ ἔχόντων τούτων ἐπενεγκεῖν παρ' ὅτου ποτ' εἰλήφασι.* In

both these cases *μή* might depend on the principal sentence. With *καὶ*, however, *μή* is more frequently found, and where, too, the concessive force is more evident. Cf. Soph., O. C., 666 :

ὅμως δὲ κάμοῦ μὴ παρόντος οἴδ' ὅτι
τούμὸν φυλάξαι σ' ὄνομα.

Possibly Aeschylus, Sup., 79, belongs here, but the text is uncertain. Instead of *καὶ μὴ τέλεον δόντες*, some editors read *ἢβᾳ μὴ τέλεον δόντες*, which entirely changes the construction. Other examples are Euripides, Electra, 531 ; Frag. Trag., Sosiphanes, 3 ; Hdt., II, 5 ; II, 35 ; VII, 214 ; Thuc., VI, 16, 5 ; VII, 63, 3 ; VIII, 73, 5 ; Xen., Ages., VIII, 1 ; De Re Eq., VI, 16 ; Antiphon, V, 87 ; Andoc., I, 114 ; Isoc., XVII, 29 ; XVIII, 25 ; Isaeus, VI, 54 ; Dem., XXII, 18 ; XXIII, 163 ; XXXVII, 18 ; LI, 7 ; (LXI, 28) ; Epis., II, 12 ; Plato (Alcib., II, 139 E). In the passages underlined the participle forms part of a clause that demands *μή*, but in the others the cause of *μή* must lie in the participle itself. It is fair to assume, therefore, that in the former class also *μή* could depend on the participle.

οὐ is occasionally found in this connection, owing to the influence of adhærescence. Cf. Homer, Iliad, IV, 300 :

ὅφρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων τις ἀναγκαίη πολεμίζοι.

= even if or though he does not wish. Cf. Sappho, I, 24 :

ταχέως φιλήσει κωνκ ἐθέλοισα.

Theognis, 392, 1342.

In the following passages no particle is used, but the participles seem to have a concessive force. Plato, Gorgias, 492 B : *οἰς ἔξօν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὸν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο* ; Ion, 535 D : *ὅς ἀν κεκοσμημένος ἐσθῆτι ποικίλῃ—κλαίῃ τ' ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἔορταῖς, μηδὲν ἀπολωλεκώς τούτων—μηδενὸς ἀποδύοντος*. Laws, I, 648 C : *ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἀν χρῶο, μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐγκαλῶν τῷ πώματι* ; these could be explained as conditional or generic.

3. *The Generic Participle with μή.*

The next division of the independent participle with *μή* is the generic participle, or that in which the condition, if expressed in full, would not appear in the form of a protasis, but in that of a general relative sentence. This participle generally has the article, but the article is not absolutely necessary to bring out the generic force, as we shall see below. The presence or absence of the article, however, enables us to divide this class into two subordinate categories. Let us take up first those in which the article is expressed. This class is the most numerous of all, and embraces over nine hundred participles. With the exception of Epic poetry it is almost universal.

οὐ is also frequently found with the articular participle, sometimes side by side with *μή*. The distinction between the two, however, is generally observed, i. e., when *οὐ* is used a definite person or set of persons is referred to, and when *μή* is employed the reference is to an indefinite class.

The first instance of the construction with *μή* is in Pindar, Nemea, IV, 31: ὁ μὴ ξυνιείς, cf. also Frag., 81: τὸ δὲ μὴ Δἰ φίλτερον, who thus marks a distinct advance on Homer.¹ The lyric poets furnish but one other example, and that from the late poet Timotheus, Frag., 15: ὁ μὴ τίνων. The examples found in the Anacreontea and the Pseudophocylidea have not been included on account of the manifestly late origin of these works. The dramatists do not use it very freely, but it abounds in prose, especially the Orators and Plato. The following table shows the range of the construction:

Homer.....	...	Tragici Min.....	3
Hesiod.....	...	Aristophanes.....	3
Theognis.....	1	Comici Min.....	5
Pindar.....	1	Herodotus.....	14
Timotheus.....	1	Thucydides.....	49
Aeschylus.....	6	Xenophon.....	117
Sophocles.....	14	Orators	322
Euripides.....	23	Plato.....	367
Total.....			926

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, Pindar, Intro., p. ci.

The absence of this construction from Epic poetry, its small use in lyric and Aristophanes, and its frequent use in the philosophical works of Xenophon, in the orators, and Plato, seem to point to the fact that it belongs neither to the very highest sphere of the language nor to that of every day life, but rather to that of argument and philosophy.

A few passages that present points of special difficulty and importance deserve mention. So Soph., O. R., 397 :

ἐγὼ μολών,
οὐ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπανσά νιν.

The use of *μή* here has been the subject of much discussion, but is now generally explained as generic with concessive force. So Whitelaw, Trans. Cambridge, Phil. Society, 1886, p. 17, and this explanation is now accepted by Jebb. Whitelaw compares Dem., xix, 31 : *ἡ βουλὴ δ' η μὴ κωλυθεῖσ' ἀκοῦσαι*, where the generic participle has a causal force. A great number of examples can be cited in which the generic participle is used with a definite antecedent ; e. g., Eurip., Iph. Au., 384 : *ἐγὼ—οὐ μὴ σφαλείσ—* also Aristoph., Wasps, 1048; Xen., Con., II, 4; Hell., VI, 1, 11; Antiphon, II, a, 3; v, 65; Isaeus, I, 11; III, 63; IV, 14; Dem., xix, 224; xxxvii, 8, 28, 57; xlvi, 38. In most of these the antecedent is the personal pronoun. Again notice Soph., Antigone, 771 :

ΧΟ. ἄμφω γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ κατακτεῖναι νοεῖς;
ΚΡ. οὐ τὴν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν · εὖ γὰρ οὖν λέγεις.

“The *μή* implies a logical condition, a concession of her innocence.”—Humphreys.

Philoctetes, 1006 :

ὦ μηδὲν ὑγιές μηδ' ἐλεύθερον φρονῶν.

Bäumlein thinks that *οὐδέν* would be better here. Kühner, § 515, N. 3, says that the mental emotion causes *μή*. Jebb thinks that the frequent use of *μηδὲν ὑγιές* with the infinitive causes *μή* here by analogy. Aken says, “*μηδὲν ὑγιές wie τὸ μὴ καλόν!*” Could we not take the whole expression as generic, with *ὦ* taking the place of the article = O thou who thinkest, &c.?

Eurip., Alcestis, 322 :

ἀλλ' αὐτίκα ἐν τοῖς μηκέτ' οὖσι λέξομαι.

The MSS. vary between *μηκέτι* and *οὐκέτι*. Since the usual distinction between *ό μὴ ὄν* and *ό οὐκ ὄν* is that the former refers to a man who is good-for-nothing, and the latter to one who is actually nothing,¹ and since the reference here is evidently to the dead, perhaps *οὐκέτι* would be better than *μηκέτι*, although both Kirchhoff and Nauck read *μηκέτι*. Cf. Thuc., II, 44, 3 : *τῶν οὐκ ὄντων*—55, 1, *τὸν οὐκ ὄντα*, both of which refer to the dead.

Aristoph., Eccl., 115 : *δεινὸν δέστην ή μὴ μπειρία*, though not containing a participle, is interesting in view of Thucydides' use of *οὐ* with abstract nouns. Cf. I, 137, 4 : *τὴν—οὐ διάλυσιν*—III, 95, 2, *τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν*—v, 35, 2, *τὴν—οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν*—50, 4, *τὴν οὐκ ἔξουσίαν*—VII, 34, 6, *τὴν—οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγήν*. Cf. also Plato, Laws, XII, 966 C : *τὴν μὴ ἐπιτροπήν*. Postgate, l. c., thinks that the distinction between *οὐ* and *μή* here is merely an artistic one, *μή* being used in the nominative case to avoid hiatus, but *οὐ* being employed in the oblique cases. We may notice first that the passage from Plato is opposed to this view, where hiatus could have been avoided by the use of *οὐκ*. Since all the passages from Thucydides are in the oblique case, it is impossible to say with certainty what he would have used in the nominative, but, in all probability, it would have been *οὐ* also, for he wished to negative the noun and yet to preserve the negative of fact, and other writers did not care to follow him in this respect.

Hdt., VI, 94 : *ό Δαρεῖος ταύτης ἔχόμενος τῆς προφάσιος καταστρέφεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοὺς μὴ δόντας αὐτῷ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ*. Here Stein, who, as we have already seen, thinks Herodotus' use of the negatives is not irreproachable, says that *οὐ* would be better than *μή* since it refers to a past event, and hence cannot denote an indefinite class. But cf. I, 64, where we have a similar passage, and where *μή* is also used. Herodotus merely conforms to the general tendency of the language which is more apt to use *μή* than *οὐ* with the articular participle.

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., I, 56; Postgate, Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc., 1886, p. 56.

In regard to Antiphon, v, 65, ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἰργασμένῳ, Maetzner says that the participle is causal, and cites a number of passages from classical Greek to support the use of *μή* with this participle. These will be taken up later. For the present we can simply say that the tendency just mentioned, to use *μή* with the articular participle, would be a sufficient explanation of *μή* here, even if the generic force were weaker. All through the passage the doer is contrasted with the non-doer in a generic, not in a specific sense. For the use of the generic participle with a definite antecedent see page 60.

A few passages in which *οὐ* and *μή* are used in consecutive clauses may be mentioned. So Isoc., xv, 269: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τερατολογίας ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς θαυματοποιίαις ταῖς οὐδὲν μὲν ὧφελούσαις . . . δεῖν δὲ τοὺς προύργους τι ποιεῖν βουλομένους καὶ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ματαίους καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον φερούσας ἀναιρεῖν. In the former case we have simply useless works of magic referred to, while in the latter case we have a contrast between a useful and a useless class of deeds, as the partitive genitive shows.¹

Again Aeschines, i, 107: τὴν πόλιν ἔβλαψε λαμβάνων παρὰ τῶν οὐ δικαίως ἀρξάντων, μάλιστα δ' ἐσυκοφάντησε τῶν ὑπευθύνων τοὺς μηδὲν ἡδικηκότας. Again the preceding partitive genitive shows that we have, in the latter case, a contrast between two classes.

Lycurgus, § 43: ὥστε—τὸν μήτε ὅπλα θέμενον—μήτε τὸ σῶμα παρασχόντα—τίς ἀν δικαστὴς—ἀπολύσειεν—τὸν οὐδὲ συμπενθῆσαι τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συμφορὰς τολμήσαντα κτέ. As the same person seems to be referred to throughout it is rather difficult to see a reason for the change in the negatives. Kühner, § 515, 3, suggests that in the first case the participle is indefinite, in the latter the defendant is referred to.

Plato, Phaedo, 79 C: τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντα—Ε, τῷ—μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι—Gorgias, 459 A, τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν—Β, ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς. In these cases it is difficult to see any other explanation for the change in the negatives except that in the course of his argument Plato is passing from generic to particular, or vice versa. See Lodge's note to the latter passage.

¹ Cf. Bäumlein, p. 277.

In poetry ἀνήρ is often used where, in prose, we should have an article, and those examples of *μή* with ἀνήρ, γυνή or χρῆμα would, as Professor Gildersleeve has suggested in his lectures on this subject, fall into line. Cf. *Theognis*, 69 :

πολυπλοκίας τ' ἐφίλησαν
οὔτως, ώς ἄνδρες μηκέτι σωζόμενοι.

= *οἱ μηκέτι σωζόμενοι*; also Soph., O. C., 73 :

τις πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος ἄρκεσις;

and Plato, Rep., IV, 426 D: *οἵει οἶόν τ' εἶναι ἄνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν*; In these latter cases, however, while we might explain ἀνδρὸς μὴ βλέποντος and ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ as equivalent to *τοῦ μὴ βλέποντος* and *τῷ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ*, the participles have a more distinctly conditional force and *μή* could also be accounted for in this way.

We see, then, how large a rôle the articular participle plays in the history of *μή* with the participle. The other division, i. e. that in which the article is lacking, is much smaller.

We may divide this class also into two subordinate categories; first, that in which the participle stands in the predicative position and hence regularly loses its article, the negative *μή*, however, being retained; and secondly, that in which the participle stands by itself and seems not to differ from the articular participle.

The first class is not very widely represented in classical Greek. In post-classical Greek, however, it is much more common.¹

The following passages seem to come under this head. A few with adjectives are included in the list.

Soph., Frag., 755 :

οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπ' ἔργων μὴ καλῶν ἔπη καλά.

= *ἔργων τῶν μὴ καλῶν*.

Euripides, H. F., 311 :

δὲ χρὴ γὰρ οὐδεὶς μὴ χρεῶν θήσει ποτέ.

¹ Cf. Gildersleeve, *Justin Martyr*, I, 9, 4.

With this example compare Frag. Trag., Incert., 368. Plato (Alcib., II, 139 A): ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα. In § 4 the same words are repeated with the addition of *εἶναι* after *ἄφρονα* showing the causative force of *ποιεῖ*.

Aristoph., Eccl., 855:

ποῖ βαδιεῖ σὺ μὴ καταθεὶς τὴν οὐσίαν;

= σὺ ὁ μὴ καταθείς. Cf. Xen., Mem., I, 6, 5: *τοῖς μὲν λαμβάνοντι ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἔστι ἀπεργάζεσθαι—έμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι.* The antithesis seems to warrant us in taking *μὴ λαμβάνοντι* as generic, although it could be very well explained as conditional; cf. ib., I, 6, 6; Hell., VI, 1, 11 and 12; Cyr., I, 3, 8; Dem., Proem., XIX.

On Thuc., I, 118, 2, cf. Morris' note. The passage reads: *ὅντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς.*

Xen., Mem., IV, 8, 5, shows how far the Greeks carried the generic idea: *οὐχ ὄρᾶς ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἥδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας—ἀπέκτειναν;* here Postgate, I. c., p. 55, explains the phrase as being equal to *πολλοὺς τῶν μηδὲν ἀδικούντων.* Some such explanation seems to be necessary. An exactly similar example is Dem., LV, 20: *τὸ—εἰσπεσὸν ὕδωρ ἔβλαψε—πολλοὺς μὴ φυλαξαμένους.* Cf. also Antiphon, V, 82: *πολλοὶ—ἄνθρωποι μὴ καθαροὶ χείρας.*

Plato, Politicus, 288 E: *σύνθετα ἐκ μὴ συντιθεμένων εἴδη γενών.* Laws, VII, 808 D: *ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην.* Ib., XII, 951 B: *φυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή.* These examples are not quite as clear as the others and possibly other influences cause the *μή*.

Passages like Eurip., Hec., 984:

ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν σε χρῆν
τί χρὴ τὸν εὖ πράσσοντα μὴ πράσσουσιν εὖ
φίλοις ἐπαρκεῖν.

may also be classed here, but inasmuch as in such cases the element of doubt enters whether *μή* does not depend on the principal verb, here *χρῆ*, they are less convincing than the preceding

examples. Similar passages are, however, Eurip., Hipp., 997; Xen., Mem., I, 3, 4; II, 1, 15; Isoc., XII, 240; Dem., XIX, 334.

In addition to these participles that are used in the predicative position we also have a second class in which the participle stands by itself and yet has the negative *μή* just as the articular participle. The reason for dropping the article is often not at hand, indeed we sometimes find the participle with the article used side by side with that without. The total number of these participles is not large compared with those that have the article, but they are sufficient to show that the article, while generally present, is not absolutely necessary to bring out the generic relation.

To cite some examples see Eurip., Helena, 433 :

ελπὶς δ' ἐκ γε πλουσίων δόμων
λαβεῖν τι ναύταις · ἐκ δὲ μὴ χόντων βίον
οὐδ' εἰ θέλοιεν, ὡφελεῖν ἔχοιεν ἄν.

It would be easy to supply *δόμων* here in which case the example would be similar to those that precede. Ib. (Rhesus, 904) :

ὅσον προσήκει μὴ γένους κοινωνίαν
ἔχοντι, κάγῳ τὸν σὸν οἰκτίρω γόνον.

= one who has, etc. Cf. Frag., 1034.

Xen., Cyr., I, 6, 6 : οἰδά σε λέγοντα ἀεὶ ὡς οὐδὲ θέμις εἴη αἰτεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἵππεύειν μὴ μαθόντας ἵππομαχοῦντας νικᾶν, and below μὴ ἐπισταμένους (bis), μὴ σπείροντας, μὴ φυλαττομένους. These participles might also be regarded as conditional.

Ib., III, 1, 19 : ὥσπερ ἄν τις τυφλοὺς καὶ κωφοὺς καὶ μηδὸν ὄτιον φρονοῦντας ἔξαπατήσειεν—VIII, 1, 2 : τίς ἄν πόλις ὑπὸ μὴ πειθομένων ἀλοίη ; τίς δ' ἄν φιλία ὑπὸ μὴ πειθομένων διαφυλαχθείη ; τί δ' ἄν ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν τελεσθείη ὑπὸ μὴ πειθομένων ;

Other examples are Mem., I, 1, 9; Hell., II, 3, 22; Dem., III, 35 : οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μηδὲν ἐγὼ ποιοῦσιν τὰ τῶν ποιούντων εἶπον ὡς δεῖ νέμειν—ib., XVIII, 128 (adjective); Proem., 56, 3; Plato, Phaedo, 67 B : μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ή—ib., 82 B; Theaet., 189 E : ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι = as one who does not know. “The use of *μή* assists the ironical tone of Socrates who avoids categorical statements.”—

Campbell. Cf. Phaedrus, 264 B, where Socrates is also speaking : ἔμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, and further Crat., 400 E, 401 D, where, however, *μή* might depend on the principal verb, but where it is most likely generic and where Socrates is again the spokesman.

In the Sophistes and the Parmenides and certain parts of the Republic we very frequently find *μὴ ὄν*, *μὴ ὄντα*, &c. In many cases we can see a conditional force that is sufficient to explain *μή*, but in others such interpretation seems strained, and we have to suppose either that *μὴ ὄν = τὸ μὴ ὄν*, or else that Plato for the sake of the argument wished to have “the predicate in the same verbal form as the adjectival part of the subject,” to quote Cook-Wilson, On some apparent Anomalies in the Use of *μή*, Trans. Oxford Phil. Soc., 1889–90, pp. 16, 17. For an example of this last use, cf. Plato, Sophistes, 258 C: ὥσπερ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ἦν μὴ καλόν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν—also Timaeus, 38 B: τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν εἶναι—cf. also such expressions as *τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν*, in Par., 162 D, 163 A, B, 165 C.

Examples of the conditional use have been included under that head. The following is an example of the generic use : *οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαῆς, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα*, where *μὴ ἔόντα = τὰ μὴ ἔόντα*. (This is a quotation from Parmenides, an examination of the fragments of whom reveals but one other example similar to this, i. e., *οὔτ’ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἔάσω κτέ*.) Other passages from the Parmenides are 238 A, 245 E, 262 C, 263 D; also Rep., v, 477 A, 478 C, 479 C.

In the Phaedrus, alongside of *ό μὴ ἐρῶν*, &c., we frequently find *μὴ ἐρῶν*, &c., used in a generic sense, although in a majority of cases the participle forms part of a clause depending on *χρή* or the verbal in *-τέον*, which may possibly have influenced the negative; cf. 227 C: *λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι*—235 E: *χρή μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι χαρίζεσθαι*—237 B, C, D: *ὅ τι δ’ αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν*. In this example *μή* must depend on the participle. Cf. also 238 E, 241 C, 243 D. It may be worth while to note that none of these examples occur in the Lysianic speech, while the articular form does occur several times. Nor does Lysias in his genuine speeches use the anarthrous form, so that we may have

here a slight proof of the genuineness of this speech, or at least of Plato's close imitation of Lysias' style.

Other examples of *μή* with the participle without the article are Rep., I, 332 E (both with and without the article); IV, 430 B (adjective); X, 599 A; Laws, III, 688 B; VII, 795 B: διαφέρει δὲ πάμπολυ μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου—799 C.

The following examples also belong here, I think, but as in each case the clause as a whole demands *μή* they are less convincing than the preceding.

Aristoph., Eccl., 578 :

ἀλλὰ πέραινε μόνον
μήτε δεδραμένα μήτ'
εἰρημένα πω πρότερον.

Xen., Cyr., V, 1, 11 : εἰ δέ γ', ἔφη, νόμος τεθείη μὴ ἐσθίοντας μὴ πεινῆν καὶ μὴ πίνοντας μὴ διψῆν κτέ, ib., Hipp., VII, 8; Dem., Proem., 56, 1, τὸ δὲ μὴ βούλομένους ἀκούειν βιάζεσθαι—Plato, Soph., 237 E, 238 B, C; Rep., II, 377 E; Laws, XI, 916 C.

4. *Μὴ οὐ with the Participle.*

In classical Greek literature there are eight passages in which *μὴ οὐ* is combined with the participle. In order to understand this construction we must go back to *μὴ οὐ* with the finite verb, as the order of development seems to have been *μὴ οὐ* with the finite verb, *μὴ οὐ* with the infinitive, and lastly *μὴ οὐ* with the participle. Under the first head it is used of an apprehended negative, chiefly with the subjunctive, after verbs of fear, etc., and equals Latin *ne non*; see any grammar or lexicon for examples. From this use comes *μὴ οὐ* with the infinitive, which is only used after a negative or negative idea, and, at first, only in passionate language. It represents *μὴ οὐ* with the subjunctive taken up into *oratio obliqua*, both negatives being retained to preserve the apprehension and to show the practical interest of the speaker. Then the construction became more and more common until it became a mere phrase. It was always confined to Herodotus, and Attic writers and their imitators. The use of *μὴ οὐ* with the

participle is explained in the same way as the use with the infinitive. It denotes the personal, practical interest of the speaker in the subject. As the infinitive it is only used when a negative idea precedes. Most authorities agree in explaining the participle in this construction as conditional,¹ although an attempt has recently been made by Whitelaw, Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc., 1886, p. 38 f., to prove that it is consecutive. The examples are all cited by Prof. Gildersleeve in Liddell and Scott under *μὴ οὐ*, and by Goodwin, l. c. The construction first appears in Sophocles, O. R., 13 :

δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἀν
εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτίων ἔδραν.

= εἰ μὴ κατοικτίροιμι. Ib., 221 :

οὐ γὰρ ἀν μακρὰν
ἴχνευον αὐτὸς μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.

Cf. Jebb, l. c., and Goodwin, § 511. The latter translates—"for I should not be very far on the track, if I were attempting to trace it alone, without a clue," thus supplying another protasis, which Jebb does also. Ib., O. C., 360 :

ῆκεις γὰρ οὐ κενή γε - - - -
- - - μὴ οὐχὶ δεῖμ' ἐμοὶ φέρουσά τι.

There is an irregularity here also, as *οὐ κενή* is virtually positive, not negative. Cf. Jebb, and Kühner, § 516, 5, N. 8. The latter thinks it should not be classed with the other examples, but with such as *οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐχ οὔτως ἔχειν*. He compares O. R., 57.

Hdt., II, 110, 2 : οὐκ ὁν δίκαιον εἶναι ἔσταναι ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἐκείνου ἀναθημάτων μὴ οὐκ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοῖσι τέργοισι, = εἰ μὴ ὑπερβάλληται ; ib., VI, 9 : καταρρώδησαν μὴ οὐ δυνατοὶ γένωνται ὑπερβαλέσθαι καὶ οὕτω οὔτε τὴν Μίλητον οἱοί τε ἔωσι ἔξελεῦν μὴ οὐκ ἔόντες ναυκράτορες. (Their thought was εἰ μὴ ναυκράτορές ἔσμεν). Ib., VI, 106, 3 : εἰνάτη δὲ οὐκ ἔξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν μὴ οὐ πλήρεος ἔόντος τοῦ κύκλου. "They refused to march out on the ninth day (and thereafter) until the moon should

¹ Cf. Goodwin, M. and T., § 818; Jebb, Appendix to Soph., O. R., p. 221.

be full" (ἐὰν μὴ πλήρης ἦ). Dem. (LVIII, 13): τίς ἀν ἐβουλήθη μικρὰ κερδᾶναι, ἔξὸν τὰ ήμίση λαβεῖν; οὐδ' ἀν εἰς μὴ οὐ συνειδῶς ἔαντῷ συκοφαντοῦντι, = εἰ μὴ συνῆδει. Plato Lysis, 212, D: οὐκ ἄρ' ἔστι φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν = εἰ μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖ. Philemon, Frag., 213, 5: οὗτ' ἀνήρ πένης γεγὼς μὴ οὐ τέχνην μαθῶν δύναιτ' ἀν ἀσφαλῶς ζῆν τὸν βίον = εἰ μὴ μάθοι.

We see, then, that with the exception of two passages (Soph., O. R., 221, and Hdt., vi, 106, 3) these participles are all plainly conditional and even those two may be explained as such without any undue straining of the language. It is hardly necessary therefore to seek a remote explanation, as Whitelaw does, when one is so near at hand.

Two other passages where *μὴ οὐ* occurs with nouns may be mentioned. Isoc., x, 47: ταύτης δὲ τιμῆς τυχεῖν οὐχ οἶν τε μὴ οὐ τὸν πολὺ τῇ γνώμῃ διαφέροντα. Dem., xix, 123: χαλεπὰλ λαβεῖν αἱ τῶν Φωκέων πόλεις μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ κτέ.

5. *Miscellaneous.*

There still remain to be discussed a few passages which, either on account of the uncertain state of the text or of the peculiar nature of the participles themselves, could not be classed elsewhere.

The Homeric Hymns were composed at different times, but they all doubtless belong near the Epic age, and they are Epic in the avoidance of *μή* with the participle. The only example noted is in the Hymn to Hermes, line 92:

καὶ τε ἴδων μὴ ἴδων εἶναι καὶ κωφὸς ἀκούσας.

There is a lacuna just before the line, and this prevents us from deciding as to the true nature of the negative. It appears, however, to be due to the infinitive. The phrase at a later period became a proverb. Cf. Dem., xxv, 89.

The Batrachomyomachia belongs to a later date than the Homeric Hymns, and by some is thought not to belong to the classical period at all. There is one example of *μή* with the participle in it, i. e., line 235:

Ψιχάρπαξ δ' ἥμυν' ἑτάρων περὶ τεθνειώτων
καὶ βάλε Πρασσαῖον μήπω γαίης ἐπιβάντα.

μήπω γαίης ἐπιβάντα = πρὶν γαίης ἐπιβῆναι, but in classical Greek *μή* c. ptc. = *πρὶν* c. inf. is only found in clauses which of themselves demand *μή* (cf. p. 17), and this is not the case here. There is, however, another reading which Stadtmüller gives on the authority of MSS. examined by him, i. e. :

καὶ βάλε Πρασσαῖον νηδύος ἐς μέσον ἡπαρ.

This seems to suit the general character of the poem better than the former reading.

Aeschylus, Septem, 436 :

τίς ἀνδρα κομπάζοντα μὴ τρέσας μενεῖ;

Verrall makes *μὴ τρέσας* = *ῶστε μὴ τρέσαι*, but Paley's explanation is perhaps better, i. e., "the not trembling is regarded as a condition of withstanding the boastful foe, i. e., no one who does tremble will meet him." He compares Eurip., Heraclidae, 533, and Isoc., VIII, 41, which are, however, more plainly conditional than the present passage ; cf. Jebb to Soph., O. C., 360, who adopts a similar explanation of a difficult negative there. *Μή* might possibly depend on the negative character of the question.

Soph., O. R., 57 :

*ώς οὐδέν εστι οὔτε πύργος οὔτε ναῦς
ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν μὴ ξυνοικούντων ἔσω.*

It is possible to take *ἀνδρῶν μὴ ξυνοικούντων* together as genitive absolute with conditional force. But as this would simply be a repetition of the preceding thought, commentators are almost unanimous in taking *ἀνδρῶν* with *ἔρημος* and making the participle merely epexegetic of it. In this case *μή* is really superfluous and is due to the tendency to repeat it after negative ideas, cf. Kühner, § 516, 5, N. 8. In O. R., 1530, *μή* is due to the influence of the *πρὶν ἄν* clause :

*ῶστε—μηδέν' ὀλβίζειν πρὶν ἄν
τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ μηδὲν ἀλγεινὸν παθών.*

Antigone, 1042 :

*οὐδὲ ὡς μίασμα τοῦτο μὴ τρέσας ἐγὼ
θάπτειν παρήσω κεῖνον.*

Ellendt cites *μὴ τρέσας* as an example of *μή* with the participle, but *οὐ* and *μή* though separated must be taken together and with *παρήσω*.

Philoctetes, 171 :

οἰκτίρω νιν ἔγωγ', ὅπως
μή του κηδομένου βροτῶν
μηδὲ ζύντροφον δυμ' ἔχων
νοσεῖ.

The force of *μή* is much discussed here. Jebb makes it generic with causal force. Ellendt says, “*non ἐπεὶ μηδεὶς κήδεται, sed καίπερ μηδεὶς κηδομένου*,” but this wrong use of *καίπερ* has already been mentioned. Kühner, § 515, 3, 3, takes the participle as causal pure and simple. Perhaps the mental emotion shown by *οἰκτίρω* and the question indicated by *ὅπως* have something to do with the negative.

Ib., 935 : *ώς μεθήσων μήποθ' ὁδὸς ὄρᾳ πάλιν.* Again we have a difficult negative and scholars vary in their explanation. Kühner, § 515, 3, explains as future participle expressing purpose; Bäumlein, p. 295, as purpose or generic, “wie in der absicht oder wie einer der nicht will;” Jebb as subjective. Aken, p. 230, says it is surprising even for Sophocles. I believe the generic force is sufficient to account for *μή*. Cf. Xen., Cyr., I, 3, 8 : *τὸν Κῦρον ἐπερέσθαι προπετῶς ώς ἀν πᾶς μηδέπω ὑποπτήσσων.*

Eurip., Iph. Au., 1586 :

ἄπας ἐπήχησε στρατός,
ἀελπτον εἰσιδόντες ἐκ θεῶν τινὸς
φάσμ', οὐ γε μηδὸν πίστις παρῆν.

The participle seems to be purely adversative—“of whom, though not seen, a pledge was present,” and hence the negative should be *οὐ*. These closing lines are bracketed by many editors, and we seem to have here an evidence of later authorship.

The Epistles of Aeschines are universally recognized as spurious, and their late origin appears to be attested by some anomalous uses of *μή*. Cf. x, 2 : *διατριβόντων γὰρ ἡμῶν πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ μὴ πληρουμένων τῆς θέας τῶν τάφων, ἦν δέ μοι γνώμη μένειν.* The participle is purely circumstantial, and *οὐ* would be expected. Again, in § 6 of the same Epistle, we have : *ἡ δὲ νύμφη ἴδοῦσα τὸν*

Κίμωνα ώς μηδὲν αὐτῷ κακὸν συνιειδότα κτέ. Here *μή* is unjustifiable, unless we explain it as generic, as in the passage from Sophocles treated above. Again, Epis. VII, 4: ὑμῶν δὲ τῆς εὔνοίας, ἦν ἀπόντι μοι παρέσχεσθε θορυβοῦντες δὴ καὶ μὴ θέλοντες ἀκροάσασθαι τῶν λοιδορούντων ἡμᾶς, πολλὴν χάριν ἔχω. *Μή* cannot be defended, unless we take it with the following infinitive. Again, Epis. XII, 3: οὐκ ἀλαζονεύομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ώς πολλὰ πάνυ λαβεῖν ἔξον μοι χρήματα μὴ λαβών. This example is the more surprising as we have had occasion to notice that this subjective *ώς* invariably takes *οὐ* in Greek of the best period, except when the principal verb demands *μή*, and frequently even then.

Plato, Philebus, 60 C: οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων ἀμικτον μὲν ἥδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὠσαύτως ἥδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν. We may take the participle as equivalent to *ώστε* with the infinitive, or explain the *μή* as being due to its predicative position.

In Pseudo-Plato, Anterastae, 135 A: ἡ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας "Ομηρος, μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναι τινα ἄλλον ὅστις ἔντείνει τὸ τόξον, μή must be taken with *εἶναι*. Cf. Thuc., VII, 50, 3: μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι—Dem., XXI, 205; XXXVI, 48.

In the following passages from the Laws *μή* seems to be due to the general character of the sentences: v, 733 C, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἔστι πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότησιν ἰσότησί τε καὶ ὄσα ἐναντία ἔστι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς βούλησιν διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν διαφέροντα πρὸς αἴρεσιν ἐκάστων—x, 901 C, οὐ γάρ που, ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ἢ τῶν ἀπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων μὴ ἐπιμελουμένω, κτέ; XI, 913 A, θησαυρὸν δὲ λέγωμεν—ὅν τις ἔθετο μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ὧν πατέρων, μήθ' εὑρεῖν ποτὲ θεοῖς εὐξαίμην.

We have already noticed under the head of the conditional participle passages in which cause and condition seem to be united in the participle, the result being that it is negated by *μή*. We have now to consider the few passages in classical Greek in which an apparently purely causal participle takes this negative. Some scholars even maintain that this is a legitimate construction. So Maetzner to Antiphon, v, 65: "non abhorret a Graecorum usu μή particula cum participio copulata." See also Kühner, § 515, 3, 3;

Gayler, *Particularum Graeci Sermonis Negativarum Disputatio*, p. 279. And quite recently Cook-Wilson, Trans. Oxford Phil. Soc., 1889–90, has made a systematic attempt to prove that *μή* with the causal participle is justified by analogy with the causal relative with *μή*.

Let us proceed to examine the passages and see what justification there is for this argument. That the causal participle takes *οὐ* even when it could easily have a conditional force is shown by Eurip., *Bacchae*, 271 :

θρασύς τε δυνατὸς καὶ λέγειν οἶός τε ἀνήρ
κακὸς πολίτης γίγνεται νοῦν οὐκ ᔁχων.

where we must translate “since he has no sense,” not “if, &c.”; cf. also Plato, *Apol.*, 20 C.

The first passage noted in which *μή* is apparently used with the causal participle is Thuc., I, 77, 3 : *οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ᔁχουσιν*. *μὴ στερισκόμενοι* gives the ground of *χάριν ᔁχουσιν*, and hence should have *οὐ*. It is possible to see a slight conditional force in the participle, and perhaps the fact that *οὐ* precedes led to the use of *μή* to avoid a repetition.¹ Ib., IV, 73, 4 : *ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων* (sc. *τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*). The participle is purely causal here, and there does not seem to be any justification for using *μή*. We can only take refuge in a corrupt state of the text. Cf. Krüger, ad loc.

Xen., Cyr., III, 1, 37 : *οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰλῆφθαι ᔁγωγε αἰχμάλωτον ταύτην νομίζω, σοῦ γε μηπώποτε φυγόντος ἡμᾶς*. Again *μή* is apparently unjustified. Ib., VI, 3, 15 : *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς μηδὲν εἰδότες, ἐκπεπλεγμένοι ἦσαν*. Cook-Wilson says that “perhaps *εἰδότας* should be read or *εἰδότες* may stand by a kind of attraction for *εἰδότας*, in which case *μή* would be natural.” And *μηδὲν εἰδότες* might stand for *οἱ μηδὲν εἰδότες*.

Dem., XLIV, 28 : *ώσθ’ ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖν—τὴν πατρώαν ούσιαν ᔁχειν, ἐφ’ ἂ τ’ εἰσεποιήθη, μὴ δύτος ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ νιοῦ, καὶ τούτων κύριος γενέσθαι*. *Μή* with the causal participle can here be explained as forming part of the infinitive clause.²

¹ For Hdt., III, 65, see p. 53; Thuc., I, 118, 2, p. 64.

² For Xen., Mem., I, 6, 12, see p. 54; Antiphon, II, β, 4, ditto; Antiphon, V, 65, p. 62; Lysias, XXVI, 10, p. 38.

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Aeschines, II, 62 : *λόγων γὰρ μὴ προτεθέντων εἰς τὴν ὑστέραν ἐκκλησίαν, τῶν δὲ προέδρων κωλυόντων, οὐκ ἐνῆν εἰπεῖν.* The participle seems to be causal, but the passage is doubtless corrupt. Cf. Cobet, V. L., p. 353.

Plato, Timæus Locrus, 101 D, and Epinomis, 985 B, are also apparently causal, but are not included on account of the spurious character of these writings.

We see, then, that the passages in which *μή* is used with the causal participle, and which do not admit of explanation, are in reality very few. Perhaps the trouble is with our text, but cf. A. J. P., XII, 520, where Prof. Gildersleeve, speaking of Cook-Wilson's paper, calls them "free negatives." These examples, however, taken in connection with those in which cause and condition meet, show us how easily later writers could be led to feel that *μή* was the proper negative to be used with the causal participle.

In tabular form the results of the preceding pages in which the independent participle with *μή* has been discussed appear as follows :

AUTHORS.	Conditional Ptc. and finite verb antithetical or parallel.	Pure conditional.	Concessive.	Generic Participle with article.	Generic Participle without article, predicate.	Generic Participle without article, not predicate.	μή οὐ with the Participle.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
Homer.....	1	1
Homeric Hymns.....	1	1	
Hesiod.....	0
Lyric Poets, not including Pindar.....	2	2	4
Pindar.....	1	1
Æschylus.....	11	6	1	18	
Sophocles.....	1	11	2	14	3	4	35
Euripides.....	1	30	3	23	3	3	1	64
Tragici Min.....	4	1	3	1	9
Aristophanes.....	8	3	3	1	1	16
Comici Min.....	(1) ¹	6	5	(1) ¹	11+2
Herodotus.....	1	30	3	14	3	51
Thucydides.....	1	42	3	49	2	3	97
Xenophon.....	3	52	2	117	7	12	3	196
Orators.....	5	161	14	322	4	3	1	6	516
Plato.....	13	202	4	367	3	31	1	5	626
Total.....	25+1	560	35	926	19	50	8+1	23	1646+2

We see, then, from this table that, just as in the case of the dependent participle, so in that of the independent, the construction is but little used in Epic and Lyric poetry, but begins to be employed quite freely by the dramatists, especially Sophocles, after whom it is exceedingly common. The two main lines of development are the pure conditional and the generic participle with the article.

III.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion let us first unite the table on page 48 and the one above, which sum up, respectively, the dependent and the independent uses of *μή* with the participle:

¹ From Philemon, hence after the classical period.

AUTHORS.	IMPERATIVE.	OPTATIVE.	VERBS OF SWEARING.	FINAL CLAUSES.	CONDITIONAL PARTITIVE, C. ETI, AND ANTE VERB.	ELITPIEAL EXPRESSIONS ETI, MUN, ETC.	INDEFINITE.	SUPPLEMENTARY.	INTERROGATIVE.	CONDITIONAL PARTITIVE AND FINAL VERB ANTHROPICAL OR PARALLEL.	PURE CONDITIONAL.	CONCESSIVE.	ARTICLE.	GENITIVE PARTITIVE WITHOUT ARTICLE, PREDICATE.	GENITIVE PARTITIVE WITHOUT ARTICLE, PREDICATE.	GENITIVE PARTITIVE WITH ARTICLE.	WITH THE PARTICIPLE.	MISCELLANEOUS.	TOTALS.	
Homer...	1	3																	3	3
Homeric Hymns.	2	2																	1	1
Hesiod....	1	1																	5	5
Lyric Poets, exclusive of Pindar....	5	1																	17	17
Pindar....	8	1																	6	6
Aeschylus....	22	9																	30	30
Sophocles...	1	1																	1	1
Euripides....	5	2																	3	3
Tragici Minores...	16	2																	1	1
Aristophanes....	11	2																	(1)	(1)
Comici Minores...	14	7																	3	3
Herodotus....	40	2																	3	3
Thucydides....	11	1																	1	1
Xenophon....	14	13																	6	6
Orators....	40	5																	31	31
Plato....	34	4																	5	5
Total....	138	4																	23	23
																			2528	2528

We see, then, that we have studied in round numbers twenty-five hundred (2,500) examples of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle. Of these about one-third (882) are indebted for the special character of their negative to the principal verb on which they depend, while in the remaining two-thirds it is the nature of the participle itself that demands $\mu\bar{\eta}$. At the bottom of this latter class is found to lie the conditional proposition, although the participle may be classed under the heads of generic and concessive in addition to the pure conditional. When $o\bar{v}$ appears in any of the above categories it can usually be explained by recourse to the principle of adhaerescence, or of oratio obliqua, or to the retention of the negative of fact. But very few cases have been noted where some such explanation cannot be legitimately employed.

Special attention has been called to the frequency with which cause and condition meet, and the ease with which later writers could be led into the habit of using $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the purely causal participle. We ought also to notice under the head of the supplementary participle the not infrequent use, from Sophocles on, of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle after verbs of knowing and thinking when the will of the speaker enters, which was another point at which the later use of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle made inroads on the classical use of $o\bar{v}$.

As to the usage of the individual authors but little has been said in the preceding pages, chiefly on account of the absence of a suitable basis of comparison, a page of poetry not being by any means equal to a page of prose. Still we may gather from the preceding table some points of interest and profit. Notice first the almost entire absence of the construction from Epic poetry and its small use in Lyric. Doubtless the themes treated had much to do with this infrequent use, but it also seems probable that in this early literature the participle itself was not felt to be as good a substitute for the finite verb as in later times. Be this as it may, it is nevertheless a fact that it is not until we come to dramatic poetry, and especially to Sophocles, that we find the construction used with any freedom.

Of the dramatic poets Aristophanes is lowest in the use of $\mu\bar{\eta}$ with the participle. Counting 8000 lines for Aeschylus, 10000 for Sophocles, 26000 for Euripides and 15000 for Aristophanes,

the average per 10000 lines without counting the examples from the fragments is : Aeschylus 36, Sophocles 61, Euripides 37, and Aristophanes 24. We cannot ascribe this small use in Aristophanes to the participle itself as by his time it had reached its full development, but it must be due to the simplicity and directness of his style.

Of the historians Xenophon in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenika* has a lower percentage than either Herodotus or Thucydides, while both the former fall much below the latter. Xenophon has on an average 9 — per one hundred Teubner pages, Herodotus 9 +, and Thucydides 26, which again coincides with the simplicity of the style of the former writers, and the close, argumentative style of the latter.

Of the orators Antiphon (Thucydides' teacher (?)) has the highest average, having 64 examples to one hundred pages, Deinarchus the lowest with but 9 —. The averages of the others are as follows : Andocides 26, Lysias 27, Isocrates 40, Isaeus 39, Demosthenes 28, Aeschines 20, Lycurgus 40. Notice that all but Deinarchus and Aeschines have a higher average than Thucydides, who stands at the head of the historians.

Xenophon in his other writings, exclusive of the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenika*, averages 30 per one hundred pages, while Plato's average is 38. Thus in oratory and philosophy $\mu\acute{\eta}$ with the participle reached its highest development.

We see, then, from the tragic poets on a steadily increasing use of $\mu\acute{\eta}$ with the participle, both in regard to the actual number of participles used, and in the variety of constructions in which they are employed. We can see also how later writers noticing, but not fully understanding these legitimate constructions, and striving for more forcible and energetic expressions, would be led to extend more and more the use of $\mu\acute{\eta}$ with the participle into domains where it properly did not belong, until they finally felt that this and this alone was its legitimate negative.

IV.

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
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
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In addition to the articles by Prof. Gildersleeve cited in the foot-notes, I am also deeply indebted to his lectures on the participle and the negatives which it has been my privilege to attend.








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
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